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THE MYTHS OF DATA EXCLUSIVITY
by
Erika Lietzan
This Article contributes to an ongoing academic and public policy
dialogue over whether and on what terms U.S. law should provide "data
exclusivity" for new medicines. Five years after a new drug has been
approved on the basis of an extensive application that may have cost
more than one billion dollars to generate, federal law permits submission
of a much smaller application to market a duplicate version of the drug.
This second application is a different type of application, and it may cost
no more than a few million dollars to prepare. A similar sequence is true
for biological medicines: 12 years after approval of an application that
may have cost over one billion dollars to generate, the law permits
approval of a smaller and less expensive application for a duplicate.
Scholars, courts, and policymakers use the phrase "data exclusivity" to
describe the period before the new pathway opens-a nod to the fact that
applications of the second type rely on the research submitted by the first
entrant. The primary "myth" of data exclusivity is that it is a benefit
provided by the government for the benefit of first entrants. This Article
breaks new ground by reframing data exclusivity instead as a period of
time during which all firms are subject to the same rules governing
market entry. It uses this insight as the foundation for an exploration of
the complex web of legal, regulatory, and practical factors that may
influence whether and on what terms firms enter the market with
duplicates during and after that period. This Article provides the first
systematic comparison of the new drug exclusivity and biological product
exclusivity schemes in order to propose an approach that could prompt
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strategic decisions-both during and after that peiod-that will
contribute to dynamic social welfare.
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Darth Vader: Calrissian. Take the princess and the Wookie to my ship.
Lando: You said they'd be left at the city under my supervision!
Darth Vader: I am altering the deal. Pray I don't alter it any further.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Lando Calrissian made a deal with Darth Vader to prevent imperial
forces from invading and occupying Cloud City. He would lead Han Solo
and his party into a trap, allowing Han Solo to be taken prisoner, in ex-
change for protecting Princess Leia and Chewbacca. When the moment
' STAR WARS: EPISODE V-THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK (Lucasfilm 1980).
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comes, however, Darth Vader orders all three taken prisoner. Lando
complains, and the response above essentially shifts the burden back to
Lando: Be grateful no more was taken. Indeed, the subtext is a threat
that, with further complaint, more might be taken. The scene gave birth
years later to an Internet meme: I am altering the x; pray I don't alter it any
further. It is commonly used to "troll" people who complain about unfa-
vorable developments.! It is a strange cognitive distortion: the notion that
a person should be accepting when something has been taken, or when
harm has been inflicted--grateful, even, that more was not taken, more
harm not inflicted. This Article suggests the same distortion has infected
discussion of the U.S. drug regulatory scheme in both academic and pol-
icy circles.
The distortion arises in connection with the question whether and
on what terms there should be "data exclusivity" for medicines. At issue
are two types of medicine, approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Admin-
istration (FDA) under different statutes: non-biological and biological
drugs. Lipitor (atorvastatin), for treatment of elevated cholesterol levels,
among other things, is an example of the former; Epogen (erythropoiet-
in alfa), an erythropoiesis-stimulating agent for various forms of anemia,
is an example of the latter. Five years after a non-biological drug has
been approved by the FDA on the basis of an extensive and expensive
application, federal law permits submission of an unlimited number of
much smaller and cheaper applications to market copies of the drug.
These copies are known as "generic" drugs. A similar sequence is true for
biological drugs: 12 years after approval of an extensive and expensive
application for a new biologic, the law permits approval of an unlimited
number of smaller and less expensive applications for close replicas of
the biologic, known as "biosimilar" biologics.3 Scholars, courts, and poli-
cymakers use the phrase "data exclusivity" to describe the period before
the second pathway opens-a nod to the fact that applications of the sec-
ond type rely on the research submitted by the first market entrant.
4
Those participating in the discussion of the merits of data exclusivity
comprise not only legal and economic scholars, but also international
and national policymakers, manufacturers, industry organizations, and
patient groups. The discussion arises today primarily in three settings:
first, ongoing adoption around the world of pathways for approval of bio-
similar biological products;' second, international treaty negotiations in
2 See I Am Altering the X KNow YOUR MEME, http://knowyourmeme.com/
memes/i-am-altering-the-x.
See infra Section II.A.
See infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text for discussion of the reliance.
There is a dispute about the label "data exclusivity" for the law in question. See infra
Section 11B for a discussion of the dispute.
" The Europeans paved the way in 2003, followed by Japan (2009), Canada
(2010), and the United States (2010), among others. See Peter Bogaert, Erika Lietzan
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which the United States and Europe ask prospective treaty partners to
commit to approaches to medicine approval and intellectual property
that are modeled on U.S. and European law;6 and third, continued dia-
logue about the design of the U.S. system, prompted at least in part by
lingering dissatisfaction with the length of the exclusivity term for biolog-
ical drugs. The merits of data exclusivity are, in other words, the topic of
intense current debate. This Article suggests a new way of looking at ex-
clusivity, and it aims to immediately inform that debate.
The well-accepted narrative of data exclusivity is that it is provided by
the government as an incentive to perform the research necessary to ob-
tain the marketing authorization in question. Further, the narrative often
states, exclusivity is analogous to a federal intellectual-property right,
& Laura Sim, Biosimilar Regulation: Important Considerations and Global Developments,
PRAc. L. (Nov. 1, 2010), http://us.practicallaw.com/3-500-9862. Efforts are underway
in other parts of the world to implement biosimilar pathways. See, e.g., China Drafts
First Biosimilar Guideline, PHARMA & MEDTECH Bus. INTELL.: PINK SHEET DAILY,
(Nov. 7, 2014), https://www.pharmamedtechbi.com/publications/the-pink-sheet-
daily/2014/11/7/china-drafts-first-biosimilar-guideline.
' See generally Brook K Baker, Ending Drug Registration Apartheid: Taming Data
Exclusivity and Patent/Registration Linkage, 34 AM.J.L. & MED. 303, 343 (2008) (arguing
that a U.S. government/industry "tag-team has been relentless" in pressing data
exclusivity terms in international trade agreements, with the result that "[d]eath by
patent is being reinforced by death by registration"). Recently, the issue has arisen in
connection with negotiation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). In August 2011,
for instance, Representative Waxman wrote to President Obama, to oppose inclusion
of the U.S. biologics-exclusivity term in the text of the TPP, stating that 12 years of
exclusivity would conflict with "stated Administration policy" reflected in budget
proposals, and "that the exclusivity period for biologics [should] be reduced to 7
years." See Letter from Rep. Henry Waxman et al. to President Barack Obama (Aug. 4,
2011) (on file with author). He was responding to a letter to the President authored
by a group of more than three dozen members of Congress, urging precisely the
opposite. See Letter from Rep. Ron Kind et al. to President Barack Obama (July 27,
2011) (on file with author) ("The U.S.-led biopharmaceutical industry would be
disadvantaged if the U.S. does not ensure consistency with U.S. law as part of the
TPP ... ."). These 2 letters and 11 others on the topic of biologics data exclusivity
were obtained by a FOIA request by Knowledge Economy International, and are
available online at http://keionline.org/node/2069. The Administration has
continued to press for an approach generally consistent with U.S. law, but as of spring
2015 the issue remained controversial. See Derrick Gingery, Biologics Exclusivity: GPhA
Making Last Stand Against TPP, PHARMA & MEDTECH Bus. INTELL.: PHARMASIA
NEWS, (Jan. 8, 2015), https://www.pharmamedtechbi.com/publications/
pharmasia-news/2015/1/8/biologics-exclusivity-gpha-making-last-stand-against-tpp;
Len Bracken, Coalition of Groups Presses Obama on TPP Provisions Concerning Medicine,
32 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 53 (Dec. 17, 2014).
7 President Obama includes a reduction in the data exclusivity term for biologics
in his proposed budget every year. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
FISCAL YEAR 2015 BUDGET IN BRIEF: STRENGTHENING HEALTH AND OPPORTUNITY FOR
ALL AMERICANS 64 (2015), http://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/budget/fy2015/
fy-2015-budget-in-brief.pdf.
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providing a sort of monopoly in the marketplace, as well as protection
from price competition, meaning competition from lower-priced replicas
that reached the market less expensively. The essence of the narrative is
that something beneficial has been given to the first entrant, the pioneer.
Section II of this Article reframes data exclusivity not as an affirma-
tive government grant, but rather as a period of time during which every
prospective market entrant faces the same regulatory barrier to market
entry. In other words, any applicant may market the molecule in question
(subject to patent considerations and business judgment), but all must
file full applications with clinical data. The central myth of data exclusivi-
ty is that it is an affirmative grant to initial entrants from the government.
Instead, "data exclusivity" is simply the phrase we use to describe the pe-
riod of time before the law provides subsequent applicants a second, and
substantially cheaper, shortcut to market. A variety of patent, regulatory,
and business considerations may drive subsequent applicants toward, or
away from, full applications for duplicates (as opposed to modified ver-
sions or even second-in-class products) in the years when all comers are
subject to the same license requirements. But "data exclusivity" in itself
does not preclude them from marketing competing products on the
same terms as the first applicant.
Section III uses the insights of the previous Section as the foundation
for exploring the question whether, and on what terms, society derives a net
benefit from a period of time during which all applicants face the same
barrier to market entry. As to whether, this Section concludes that there is
a compelling public health need for a shortcut pathway for medicines
given the resultant lowering of drug prices. But, refraining exclusivity as a
period of time when all competitors face the same barrier to entry brings
into greater focus the impact of approval shortcuts-and decisions about
how those shortcuts are designed-on incentives to innovate. According-
ly, in order to answer the question on what terms, this Section explores
three fundamental structural differences between the two U.S. data-
exclusivity schemes (one for biological drugs and the other for non-
biological drugs) that have been largely unexplored in the academic lit-
erature to date. As to each structural difference, it describes the impact
each scheme's approach could have on company incentives to bring for-
ward new treatments for patients, both during and after the period when
all entrants are subject to the same rules.
The goal of this Article is to orient scholars and policymakers to a
new way of thinking about data exclusivity and to suggest an overall ap-
proach that will maximize dynamic social welfare-innovation for tomor-
row's patients, in addition to less expensive replicas for today's patients.
Section III, therefore, ultimately recommends taking design elements
from each U.S. scheme and one from European data-exclusivity law that
may mitigate a key weakness in both U.S. schemes. Section IV of the Arti-
cle, the conclusion, discusses the possible impact of the overall proposed
2016]
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exclusivity scheme-all pieces working together-on behaviors in the
marketplace both during the period when all entrants are subject to the
same rules and after this period ends and the shortcut becomes available.
II. REFRAMING DATA EXCLUSIVITY
The United States bifurcates its regulation of medicines. The FDA li-
censes most biological drugs under the Public Health Service Act (PHSA)
and approves non-biological drugs under the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (FDCA) .Although this statutory bifurcation is largely a re-
sult of historical accident,9 and the pathways to the market for pioneers
are largely harmonized in practice, the statutes take significantly different
approaches to abbreviated applications and data exclusivity.
A. Pathways to Market
1. Non-Biological Drugs
Under the FDCA, a new drug application (NDA) for a non-biological
drug must contain full reports of the investigations performed to deter-
mine whether the drug is safe and effective for the conditions of use in its
labeling.'0 This requires "substantial evidence," which is defined to in-
clude at least one adequate and well-controlled clinical investigation."
The traditional approach is to perform two Phase III (pivotal) clinical tri-
als that prove effectiveness following earlier phase trials that explored
safety and provided initial insight into effectiveness.'" NDAs typically con-
' See 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2012); Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 21
U.S.C. §§ 301-399f (2012). The text indicates that the FDA licenses "most" biologics
under the PHSA because a handful of protein products currently approved under the
FDCA meet the definition of "biological product." Congress has directed that new
drug applications for biologics currently licensed under the FDCA be converted to
biologics license applications under the PHSA beginning in 2020. See Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 7002(e) (2), 124 Stat. 119,
817 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262(e) (2)).
' See Krista Hessler Carver, Jeffrey Elikan & Erika Lietzan, An Unofficial Legislative
History of the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 65 FooD & DRUG L.J.
671, 682-83 (2010).
FDCA, 21 U.S.C. § 355(a)-(b).
Id. § 355(d). The statute originally referred to investigations (plural), but it
was amended in 1997 to confirm that one trial is sufficient. See Food and Drug
Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 115(a), 111 Stat.
2296, 2313 ("If the Secretary determines, based on relevant science, that data from
one adequate and well-controlled clinical investigation and confirmatory evidence
(obtained prior to or after such investigation) are sufficient to establish effectiveness,
the Secretary may consider such data and evidence to constitute substantial evidence
for purposes of the preceding sentence.").
12 See 21 C.F.R. § 312.22 (2015); AVIK S.A. Roy, MANHATTAN INST. FOR POLICY
RESEARCH, STIFLING NEW CURES: TriE TRUE COST OF LENGTHY CLINICAL DRUG TRIALS
3 (Mar. 2012), http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/fda_05.pdf.
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tain data from dozens of analytical (laboratory) studies, preclinical (ani-
mal) studies, and clinical (human) trials. 3 As a regulatory matter, it is al-
so permissible to pay another company (that has done the research) for
the right to reference some, or all, of the company's research, which then
substitutes for some, or all, of one's own research. The result is still a full
NDA.1
4
The Hatch-Waxman Amendments of 1984 created the statuto ab-
breviated new drug application (ANDA) pathway for generic drugs. ° An
ANDA contains data demonstrating that the proposed generic drug is the
same as, and bioectuivalent to, a drug previously approved by the FDA as
safe and effective. The previously approved drug is known as a "refer-
ence drug," "reference product," or "reference listed drug." The pro-
posed drug is the "same" as its reference product if it has the same active
ingredient, route of administration, dosage form, and strength, although
the FDA will permit deviations if no clinical data are necessary to estab-
lish the safety and effectiveness of the generic in question.'7 Indeed, the
FDA may not require clinical data in a generic application, apart from
pharmacokinetic data needed to show bioequivalence.'
8
There is also a third category of drug application under the FDCA:
the "505(b) (2) application," named after the provision of the Act in
which it appears. This application may rely on a previously approved ap-
plication, but need not copy the previously approved product slavishly. In
other words, the applicant may propose innovations (such as new indica-
tions, new routes of administration, or even changes to the active ingre-
dient) and support those innovations with original clinical data.'9 In addi-
tion to relying on a previously approved application, a 505(b)(2)
application may rely on published literature describing adequate and
well-controlled investigations, if the applicant lacks a right of reference to
the underlying raw data.2°
13 Erika Lietzan, A New Framewor* for Assessing Clinical Data Transparency Initiatives,
18 MARQ. IN17ELL. PROP. L. REV. 33, 41 (2014). Depending on the molecule and
therapeutic category, the clinical trials can range from surprisingly modest to
enormous. For an example of the latter, consider two factor Xa inhibitors (a new
class of anti-coagulants that act directly on Factor X in the coagulation cascade
without using anti-thrombin as a mediator), Xarelto and Eliquis, that were studied in
more than 130,000 patients prior to approval. See Roy, supra note 12, at 6.
" FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: APPLICATIONS COVERED BY SECTION 505(B) (2)
(drft. Oct. 1999) [hereinafter 505(b)(2) GUIDANCE], http://www.fda.gov/ucm/
groups/fdagov-public/@fdagov-drugs-gen/documents/document/ucm079345.pdf.
'5 Carver, Elikan & Lietzan, supra note 9, at 676-77; see Drug Price Competition
and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch-Waxman Act), Pub. L. No. 98-417,
98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 3550)).
" FDCA, 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2) (A) (iv).
17 Id. § 3 5 5 (j) (2) (C).
IS Id. § 355(j) (2) (A).
, See 505(b) (2) GUIDANCE, supra note 14, at 4-5.
20 Id.
20161
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The FDCA contains two exclusivity rules relating to the timing of
ANDAs and 505(b) (2) applications: a five-year rule and a three-year rule,
conventionally known as new chemical entity (NCE) exclusivity and new
product (NP) exclusivity. In brief, an abbreviated application may be
submitted five years after approval of a full application for a new chemi-
cal entity, and an abbreviated application may be approved three years
after approval of other full applications. 2 ' The five-year prohibition on
submission shortens to four years if the generic applicant challenges a
patent claiming the pioneer's drug or a method of using that drug.
22
A third set of timing rules-which are not data exclusivity rules-
connect approval of these abbreviated applications to the pioneer's pa-
tent portfolio. Every NDA must identify the patents that claim the new
drug in question or a method of using the drug.23 A generic applicant
must address each-stating either that: (a) it intends to wait until patent
expiry before marketing its product; or (b) the patent in question is inva-
lid or not infringed. The former is called a "paragraph III certification",
and the latter a "paragraph IV" certification, after the provisions of the
statute in which they appear.24 If the generic applicant includes a para-
graph III certification, FDA approval of the generic drug may not take
effect until patent expiry.25 If the generic applicant includes a paragraph
1V certification, challenging a patent, FDA approval may take effect im-
mediately, unless the NDA holder or patent owner files a patent in-
26fringement suit within 45 days. In that scenario, FDA approval is stayed
for 30 months. 27 Also, if the litigation begins during the fifth year after
NCE approval, the stay is lengthened to toll FDA approval of the generic
21
until seven-and-a-half years after NCE approval. If the generic company
prevails during the stay, the stay ends and FDA approves the generic
drug. If the innovator prevails during or after the stay, the generic com-
2' See FDCA, 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(c) (3) (E) (ii)-(iv, (j) (5) (F) (ii)-(iv). The three-year
rule applies so long as the application contained clinical data, other than
bioavailability data, essential to its approval. The statute also contains provisions
making these terms 2 and 10 years, rather than 3 and 5 years, for products approved
between 1982 and 1984. Id. § 355(c)(3)(E)(i), (v); id. § 355(j) (5) (F) (i), (v). These
are conceptually identical to the NP and NCE provisions. Provisions more recently
added to the statute confirm that enantiomers and antibiotics are, in some instances,
entitled to NCE exclusivity. Id. §§ 355(u) (enantiomers), (v) (antibiotics).
Id. §§ 355(c) (3) (E) (ii), (j) (5) (F) (ii).
23 Id. § 355(b) (1). Specifically, this requirement applies to any patent that claims
the drug or claims a method of using the drug "and with respect to which a claim of
patent infringement could reasonably be asserted if a person not licensed by the
owner engaged in the manufacture, use, or sale of the drug." Id.
" Id. §§ 355(b) (2) (A) (iii), (iv).
2' Id. § 355(c) (3) (B).
"6 Id. § 355 (c) (3)(C).
2 Id.
" Id. § 355(c) (3) (E) (ii).
[Vol. 20:1
THE MYTHS OF DATA EXCLUSIVITY
pany must convert its paragraph IV certification to a paragraph III certi-
29fication and FDA approval takes effect only after patent expiry.
As a practical matter, the five-year prohibition on submission of ge-
neric drug applications citing new chemical entities generally results in a
guarantee of at least six to seven-and-a-half years before generic market
entry. This is for two reasons. First, if there is no patent challenge, FDA
review and approval of an application submitted after five years might
take another year.sW Second, as just noted, if a patent challenge results in
patent litigation, the stay of FDA approval will generally preclude generic
31
market entry until seven-and-a-half years.
The FDA generic approval timing provisions tied to the pioneer's pa-
tent portfolio are known as "linkage." The linkage provisions are general-
ly outside the scope of this Article. This Article focuses on the exclusivity
rules, which, standing alone, contemplate either three years until generic
drug approval or four/five years until generic application submission,
depending on whether the innovative product is a new chemical entity.
2. Biologic Drugs
The FDA licenses biological drugs under the PHSA. This statute does
not require proof of safety and effectiveness, but rather proof of safety,
32purity, and potency: Biological products are, however, also drugs, and
since receiving jurisdiction in the 1970s, the FDA has required proof of
safety and effectiveness. It has also applied the substantial-evidence
standard for effectiveness, albeit more flexibly than for non-biological
drugs.33 The contents of biologics license applications (BLAs) are there-
fore roughly analogous to the contents of NDAs.
The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009
(BPCIA) created the abbreviated pathway to market for biological prod-
ucts.3 4 An abbreviated application must show that the proposed prod-
uct-known as a "biosimilar" rather than a "generic"-is highly similar to
Id. § 505(c) (3) (C) (ii).
'( The FDA's current performance goals anticipate the agency reviewing and
acting on 90% of complete ANDAs within 10 months of submission. See Generic Drug
User Fee Act Program Performance Goals and Procedures 5, FDA, http://www.
fda.gov/downloads/ForIndustry/UserFees/GenericDrugUserFees/UCM282505.pdf.
" Recent amendments to patent law give third parties, like generic companies,
an opportunity to challenge issued patents at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO). See 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2012). It is possible that these new inter partes review
procedures will shift patent disputes between innovators and generic companies to
the PTO and out of the courts, which in turn may affect the average timing of generic
entry.
3" See Public Health Service Act (PHSA), 42 U.S.C. § 262(a) (2) (C) (i) (I) (2012).
" See Procedures for Review of Safety, Effectiveness, and Labeling, 37 Fed. Reg.
16679 (Aug. 18, 1972) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 273) (now pt. 601.25).
3 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 7002,
124 Stat. 119, 807-21 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262); see also Carver, Elikan &
Lietzan, supra note 9, at 671.
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its reference product and that there are no clinically meaningful differ-
ences between the two. 35 The law presumes that these applications will
contain clinical data, although it grants the FDA authority to waive the
requirement. These clinical data derive from head-to-head comparative
trials with the reference product that are designed to show similarity ra-
ther than safety and effectiveness.37
The PHSA contains one data-exclusivity rule relating to the timing of
biosimilar applications. A biosimilar application may be submitted four
years after first licensure of the reference product and approved after 12
years.3 8 The 4- and 12-year clocks start with first licensure, and the statute
adds that certain FDA approvals are not first licensure. To begin with,
when the FDA approves a supplement to an application (for instance, for
a new use-also known as an "indication"), the approval in question is
not a first licensure and does not trigger a new exclusivity clock.39 More
significantly, certain subsequent full applications do not count as first li-
censure. These are applications filed by the same sponsor or manufac-
turer (or its licensor, predecessor in interest, or other related entity) for:
(1) "a change (not including a modification to the structure of the bio-
logical product) that results in a new indication, route of administration,
dosing schedule or form, delivery system, or strength; or (2) a modifica-
tion to the structure of the biological product that does not result in a
change in safety, purity, or potency. " ' ° Section III takes up interpretation
of this provision, but in brief the idea is that certain follow-up applica-
tions from the same company or a related company will not be protected
by a separate 12-year exclusivity period.
No provisions in the PHSA expressly tie the timing of FDA approval
to patents that might be infringed by the biosimilar applicant. There is a
scheme for patent litigation prior to biosimilar market entry, but it is dif-
ferent from the patent-litigation scheme in the FDCA for non-biological
drugs, and no provision addresses the timing of FDA approval.4'
31 SeePHSA, 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(2).
" Id. § 262(k) (2) (A) (ii).
17 See, e.g., FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERATIONS IN
DEMONSTRATING BIOSIMILARITY TO A REFERENCE PRODUCT 7 (Apr. 2015), http://
www.fda.gov/ucm/groups/fdagov-public/documents/document/ucm291128.pdf
[hereinafter ScIENIFIC CONSIDERATIONS GUIDANCE].
42 U.S.C. § 262(k) (7) (A)-(B).
Id. § 262(k) (7) (C) (i).
0 d. § 262(k) (7) (C) (ii).
Since enactment of the statute, there has been a dispute over whether the
premarket patent-litigation process in the PHSA-which involves an exchange of
information beginning when the biosimilar applicant shares its marketing application
with the innovator-is mandatory for biosimilar applicants. In July 2015, a three-
judge panel of the Federal Circuit ruled that the process is not mandatory, and that
when a biosimilar applicant fails to initiate the process, the innovator's sole remedy is
to sue for patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012). See Amgen Inc. v.
[Vol. 20:1
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3. Old Drugs
Complicating all of this is the theoretical possibility for non-
biological drugs of generic market entry as an "old drug." This is because
the FDCA requires a premarket application only for a "new drug." The
definition of "new drug" has changed over time, but for about 40 years
generic drugs reached the market as "old drugs" and even now most
nonprescription drugs reach the market as "old drugs"-all without pre-
market applications.
From 1938 to 1962, a drug that was "generally recognized as safe"
under the conditions described in its labeling could be marketed without
submission of an NDA. 2 In the years following enactment of the statute
in 1938, once a pioneer brought a new drug to market via the NDA
route, other companies brought copies (the equivalent of today's gener-
ics) to market without submitting applications. Some did so on the
strength of their own reasoning that the drugs in question were generally
recognized as safe because other companies held effective NDAs for their
versions. 3 Others did so on the strength of affirmative written opinions
from the agency to that effect-known as "old drug opinions.""
Since 1962, the statutory rule has been different: no application is
required if a drug is generally recognized as safe and effective, and if it has
been marketed to a material extent or for a material time, under the
conditions described in its labeling. 5 Following the 1962 amendments to
the FDCA, the FDA withdrew all of the old drug opinions it had previous-
ly issued. Therefore, as a practical matter, a generic drug company wish-
ing to market a generic drug faced a choice: (a) reach a decision inter-
nally that the drug was generally recognized as safe and effective because
of another company's NDA, and thus not subject to the NDA require-
ment; or (b) file a premarket application with the agency. In the late
Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d 1347, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Request for a rehearing en banc
was denied on October 16, 2015.
42 The statute at the time defined a "new drug" as any drug not "generally
recognized" as "safe for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or
suggested" in its labeling. 21 U.S.C. § 321 (p) (1) (1958).
" Under the scheme in place from 1938 to 1962, the FDA did not approve
applications. Instead, an NDA became "effective" unless the agency objected. 21
U.S.C. § 355(c) (1958).
" See PETER BARTON HUTT ET AL., FOOD AND DRUG LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS,
775-76 (4th ed. 2014); see also Carlen S. Magad, Comment, Generic Drugs: Breaking the
Definitional Barriers toFHDA Regulations, 76 Nw. U. L. REv. 613, 617-18 (1981).
" Congress redefined "new drug" as any drug not generally recognized as "safe
and effective" as described in the labeling, or any drug which "as a result of
investigations" is so recognized but which has not otherwise "been used to a material
extent or for a material time" under the conditions described in its labeling. See Drug
Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 10(a)(1), 76 Stat. 780, 781 (adding the
"effective" language); Kenneth C. Baumgartner, Getting a Grip on Material Time and
Extent, 49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 433, 434 (1994) (discussingjudicial interpretations of the
"new drug" definition).
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1960s, bowing to pressure to ease the burden on those who opted for
premarket review, the agency developed, through rulemaking, an "ab-
breviated new drug application" (ANDA) pathway. 6 This application-
like today's ANDA--contained proof of sameness and bioequivalence but
no proof of safety and effectiveness. It was available to anyone seeking to
copy a pre-1962 product. And an ANDA was-and still is-a type of new-
drug application.
The FDA also announced that it would take regulatory action against
any generic drug marketed without an approved application, effectively
saying that-contrary to the generic industry's position on the matter-
approval of an NDA did not render the underlying drug generally recog-
nized as safe and effective. 47 In other words, it eliminated the "old drug"
pathway for generics. 48 This meant that every generic company would
need an approved application-either an NDA or an ANDA. The prob-
lem for the generic industry was that the ANDA regulation on the books
permitted copies of only pre-1962 pioneer drugs.49 The FDA attempted to
fill the gap with a "paper NDA" pathway for copies of post-1962 drugs;
this would have permitted generic applicants to submitxublished litera-
ture as proof of safety and effectiveness of their copies. But innovators
rarely placed enough information in published journal articles to make
this a viable pathway for generic companies. Although the FDA consid-
ered extending the ANDA regulation to permit copies of post-1962 drugs
and even drafted proposed regulations to that effect, the effort stalled
due to concerns that the contents of post-1962 NDAs were trade secrets.
5
1
The proposal was never published in the Federal Register. Enactment of
" See New Drugs, 34 Fed. Reg. 2673 (proposed Feb. 27, 1969); New Drugs, 35
Fed. Reg. 6574 (Apr. 24, 1970) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 130).
17 Marketed New Drugs Without Approved New Drug Applications, 41 Fed. Reg.
41,770-71 (Sept. 23, 1976).
" The Courts of Appeals divided on whether generic drugs were new drugs
requiring applications. Compare Premo Pharm. Labs., Inc. v. United States, 629 F.2d
795, 805 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that FDCA's "new drug" definition applies to drug
products, not just to active ingredients), with United States v. Generix Drug Corp.,
654 F.2d 1114, 1120 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (finding that FDA approval is not
required for a drug containing the same active ingredient as a previously approved
drug), rev'd, 460 U.S. 353 (1983). The Supreme Court effectively sided with the
agency by concluding that the "generally recognized as safe and effective" inquiry
focuses on the finished drug product rather than the active ingredient. Generix Drug
Corp., 460 U.S. at 457.
" See Generic Pharm. Ass'n, Supplemental Comment Letter on Pfizer, Inc and
Pharmacia Corp. Citizen Petition, at 4 (Oct. 9, 2003), http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/
dockets/dailys/03/oct03/ 101403/01 p-0323-c000006-vo12.pdf.
'o See id.
5' See id. at 5, 17; see also Closing the Gaps in Hatch-Waxman: Assuring Greater Access
to Affordable Pharmaceuticals: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, &
Pensions, 107th Cong. 52 (2002) (statement of GregoryJ. Glover, on behalf of Pharm.
Research & Mfrs. of Am.).
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the Hatch-Waxman generic-drug pathway in 1984-authorizing ANDAs
52for copies of any new drug-mooted the exercise.
Today, it is probably not possible as a practical matter for a generic
drug company to argue, after time has passed, that a previously approved
new chemical entity is no longer a new drug and that a generic copy
therefore does not require an approved application. But it is theoretically
possible as a legal matter for a drug to attain "old drug" status and be
thereby exempt from premarket approval requirements.
B. Exclusivity Narratives
There are several ways to characterize the pathway provisions and
timing rules described in the preceding Subsection. Before exploring
those, it is worth noting a terminology problem: divergence regarding
the phrases "data exclusivity" and "market exclusivity." Some use "data
exclusivity" to refer to statutory prohibitions on submission of abbreviated
applications and "market exclusivity" to refer to statutory prohibitions on
approval of abbreviated applications and by extension market entry. Oth-
ers use "data exclusivity" to refer to statutory provisions relating to either
approval or submission of abbreviated applications, on the theory that these
applications rely on the data submitted in earlier applications. These
writers reserve "market exclusivity" for schemes (such as orphan drug ex-
clusivity, discussed later in this Article) that preclude submission or ap-
proval of any application, regardless of whether it relies on an innovator's
data. One terminology approach or the other must be adopted in order
to move forward with a piece of writing." This Article takes the latter ap-
proach. By "data exclusivity," this Article thus refers to prohibitions on
submission or approval of abbreviated applications, which implicitly or ex-
plicitly rely on previously submitted data. And by "market exclusivity," it
refers to prohibitions on submission or approval of any competing appli-
cation, even if supported by a full complement of original data. Section I
explains why this disagreement is not merely a vocabulary quarrel but has
substantive implications.
See infra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
Further, most marketed nonprescription drugs are old drugs without approved
NDAs. Regulations in 21 C.F.R. pt. 330 (2015), specify active ingredients, dosages,
and labeling claims that render a nonprescription drug not new and not misbranded.
Any person may comply with the relevant regulation--called a monograph-and
avoid the NDA process altogether. See generally Over-the-Counter Drugs, 37 Fed. Reg.
85 (proposed Jan. 5, 1972) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 130) (now at pt. 330).
- Professor Heled has taken a third approach: referring to both as "regulatory
competitive shelters," which avoids the dispute altogether. SeeYaniv Heled, Regulatory
Competitive Shelters, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 299 (2015). The present Article focuses on a
distinction between what it labels "data exclusivity" and what it labels "market
exclusivity," however, so it must adopt differing labels. See infra Section II.C
(comparing NCE exclusivity and orphan exclusivity).
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This Article suggests a new way of characterizing the function of data-
exclusivity provisions. The conventional narrative indicates that data ex-
clusivity is affirmatively provided by the state-the subtext being that the
natural state of affairs is one without data exclusivity. 55 Many legal scholars
and policy writers describe data exclusivity as comparable to intellectual
property, as patent-like, or even as a sub-type of intellectual property.
56
The innovative industry also tends to characterize it as a type of intellec-
tual property.57 Both economic and legal scholars analogize to monopoly
when describing market conditions during data exclusivity-the subtext
" E.g., Twenty-First Century Cures: Examining the Role of Incentives in Advancing
Treatments and Cures for Patients: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm.
on Energy & Commerce, 113th Cong. 9, 86 (2014) (statement of Rep. Henry A.
Waxman, Member, H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce) (asserting that, in the
Hatch-Waxman Amendments, Congress "gave the brands 5 years of exclusivity" and
in the BPCIA "we gave 12 years of exclusivity to biologics" (emphasis added)).
Scholars, too, use the language of an affirmative grant from the government. E.g.,
CARLOS MARIA CORREA, PROTECTION OF DATA SUBMITTED FOR THE REGISTRATION OF
PHARMACEUTICALS: IMPLEMENTING THE STANDARDS OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT
(2002), http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/policy/protection of data.pdf ("data...
are subject to a sui generis system of protection, based on a temporary right to the
exclusive use of such data. . . ."); Katherine N. Addison, The Impact of the Biosimilars
Provision of the Health Care Reform Bill on Innovation Investments, 10 J. MARSHALL REv.
INTELL. PROP. L. 553, 563 (2011) ("The BPCIA grants an exclusivity period...."
(emphasis added)); id. at 565 ("Reference product sponsors are rewarded.., with
twelve years of [data] exclusivity." (emphasis added)); Baker, supra note 6, at 307 ("In
addition to securing data exclusivity and patent term extensions to compensate for
regulatory delays via the Hatch-Waxman Act. ... " (emphasis added)); Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Lecture, Patents, Product Exclusivity, and Information Dissemination: How Law
Directs Biopharmaceutical Research and Development, 72 FORDHAM L. REv. 477, 482-83
(2003) (stating that the FDA "confers formal exclusivity in product markets" and
"reward[s] innovation by granting valuable exclusionary rights" (emphases added)).
The present Author has herself used the term "grant" in many publications and
presentations; it is the conventional narrative.
SE.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 345, 360 (2007) ("FDA-administered proprietary rights in
regulatory data, awarded to encourage particular kinds of innovation"); id. at 361
("patent-like protection under the auspices of the FDA"); Robert Alan Hess,
Excavating Treasure from the Amber of the Prior Art: Why the Public Benefit Doctrine Is Ill-
Suited to the Pharmaceutical Sciences, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 105, 107 (2011) ("pseudo-
patents"); Trudo Lemmens & Candice Telfer, Access to Information and the Right to
Health: The Human Rights Case for Clinical Trials Transparency, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 63,
84-85 (2012) ("patent-style protection"); John R. Thomas, Toward a Theory of
Regulatory Exclusivities, in PATENT LAW IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIvE 345, 347 (Ruth L.
Okediji & Margo A. Bagley eds., 2014) ("fairly described as the newest form of
intellectual property").
" See, e.g., PIARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM. (PHRMA), SPECIAL 301 SUBMISSION
2015, at 2-11 (2015), http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/PhRMA-2015-
Special-301-Rev.pdf (discussing data exclusivity/protection as an intellectual-property
right); id. at 8 ("IP rights, including patents, trademarks, and regulatory data
protection.").
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again being that natural competition has been affirmatively blocked by
the Statei 8 The key to the conventional narrative is that exclusivity is arti-
ficial and provided, as a benefit, to pioneers.
But there is another way to understand what is going on. The gov-
ernment requires a license to market new drugs, which it will issue after
reviewing the results of research to support the marketability of the drug.
Anyone may apply for a license, and indeed--subject to any relevant pa-
tent protection one or another of the companies might enjoy as well as
their business judgment about the value of the investment-multiple
companies may file for licenses to market the same drug or drugs that are
similar. That is to say, the drug approval statutes-the regulatory apparat-
uses-do not preclude two, or three or more applicants from seeking ap-
proval of the same thing on the same terms. From a regulatory perspec-
tive, all face the same scientific burden-preclinical and clinical research
in a full application, showing the finished product is safe and effective.59
The second and third applicant will have a reduced burden as a practical
matter simply because approval of the first product-and the large vol-
ume of information released about the contents of the application-will
eliminate much of the trial and error that the first applicant experi-
enced. 60 They will know what to study and what not to study, they will
E.g., LAURENCE J. KOTLIKOFF, STIMULATING INNOVATION IN THE BIOLOGICS
INDUSTRY: A BALANCED APPROACH TO MARKETING ExCLUSIVITY 1 (Sept. 2008),
http://www.kodikoff.net/sites/default/files/KotlikoffInnovation in Biologics2l.
pdf ("monopoly"); Alfred B. Engelberg et al., Balancing Innovation, Access, and
Profits-Market Exclusivity for Biologics, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1917, 1918 (2009)
("boon"); Yaniv Heled, Why Primary Patents Covering Biologics Should Be Unenforceable
Against Generic Applicants Under the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act, 21
ANNALS HEALTH L. 211, 218 (2012) ("monopolies"); Emily Marden, Open Source Drug
Development: A Path to More Accessible Drugs and Diagnostics?, 11 MINN.J.L. Sc. & TECH.
217, 264 (2010) ("monopoly"); Vincent J. Roth, Will Data Exclusivity Make Biologic
Patents Passi?, 29 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. LJ. 249, 251, 303 (2013)
("measure of monopoly" and "form[] of intellectual property"); Sarah Sorscher,
Note, A Longer Monopoly for Biologics?: Considering the Implications of Data Exclusivity as a
Tool for Innovation Policy, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 285, 289 (2009) ("expanding
monopoly protection").
A finished product, also called a drug product or a finished drug product, is
the final form of the drug for administration to patients-for example, a tablet or
capsule that contains the active drug substance and often other ingredients. See 21
C.F.R. § 314.3 (2015).
0 The contents of the application are summarized in the approved labeling, but
they are also described in detail in the "action package" released by the FDA pursuant
to § 505(1) of the FDCA. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(1) (2012). The action package includes a
review memorandum (or several review memoranda) from each reviewing discipline
at the agency-e.g., medical reviewers, clinical pharmacology reviewers, and statistical
reviewers-as well as a summary memorandum explaining the agency's decision.
Additional information about the supporting clinical trials is typically available
through the National Institutes of Health at www.clinicaltrials.gov, and often through
peer-reviewed medical journals. See generally Lietzan, supra note 13 (discussing clinical
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know how to design their trials, they will know what results to expect, and
they can reverse engineer the first entrant's product to determine a suit-
able formulation, route of administration, dosage form, and strength. All
of this will save these applicants some time and money, but the bulk of
their expenses remain, deriving from the clinical trials that must still be
61performed to obtain a license.
After a period of time, federal law permits other companies to obtain
licenses for identical or highly similar medicines without the same amount
of supporting research. The drug approval statutes remove the high evi-
dentiary hurdle and substitute a different one, with a significantly lower
investment requirement. A license to market is now available for the
price of comparative analytical testing and perhaps modest comparative
clinical testing. As a scientific matter, these follow-on applicants are able
to obtain licenses because they rely on the research performed by the
earlier applicant. That these are reliance-based applications should not
be controversial. FDA has conceded that as a regulatory matter a follow-
on applicant uses the first entrant's research, even if sometimes couching
it as using the "fact" of the first entrant's approval. 62 Many courts charac-
terizing generic drug approval use the same language.63 In brief, then,
data confidentiality and disclosure). The information publicly available does not
include the raw data or the applicant's clinical study reports, but it contains a
substantial amount of information that can guide subsequent applicants studying the
same or a related molecule.
6 SeeRov, supra note 12, at2.
62 See Letter from Janet Woodcock, Dir., Ctr. for Drug Eval. & Research, to
Katherine [sic] M. Sanzo et al. at 10 n.14 (Oct. 14, 2003), http://www.
fdalawyersblog.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2015/07/Takings-CP-Response-
505b2.pdf ("[R]eliance on an FDA finding of safety and effectiveness for an NDA is
certainly indirect reliance on the data submitted in the original NDA.... ."); see also
CTR. FOR DRUG EVAL. & RESEARCH, FDA, A BRIEF BACKGROUND ON THE REGULATION
oF GENERIC DRUGS (AKA OGD 1o), at slide 8 (Aug. 7, 2014) (showing that a generic
application must show bioequivalence with the innovator's drug in order to avoid
submission of clinical studies); Letter from Steven K. Galson, Dir., Ctr. for Drug Eval.
& Research, to Kathleen M. Sanzo et al. at 31 (May 30, 2006), http://www.
fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/04P0231/04P-0231-pdnOOOl.pdf (noting that FDA's
approval of the drug Omnitrope was based on the "finding of safety and effectiveness
for Genotropin" which was, "in turn, based upon additional adequate and well-
controlled studies" cited in the Genotropin application).
See, e.g., Purepac Pharm. Co. v. Thompson, 354 F.3d 877, 879 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(describing ANDAs as applications "that 'piggyback' on the safety-and-effectiveness
information that the brand-name manufacturers submitted in their NDAs"); Am.
Bioscience, Inc. v. Thompson, 243 F.3d 579, 580 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (observing that
ANDA applicants are "relying on the NDA filed by the original manufacturer");
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Shalala, 91 F.3d 1493, 1495 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (stating that a
generic applicant "may rely upon research paid for by the manufacturer of the listed
drug"); Zenith Labs., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., No. 96-1661, 1996 WL 33344963, at *1
(D.N.J. Aug. 7, 1996) (describing the ANDA process as allowing an applicant to "rely
upon the pioneer company's tests."); Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1546 (Fed.
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once data exclusivity expires, any applicant may justify market entry using
the research paid for and submitted by the pioneer to justify its own entry
to the market. This reframes data exclusivity as a period before the law
gives the pioneer's competitors something not previously available to
them-a faster and cheaper license, resulting from permission to rely on
the pioneer's research.
The question of how much faster and cheaper is the subject of some
dispute. The length of time to bring a new molecular entity from the re-
search laboratory to patients in finished product form varies, but general-
ly averages 10 to 12 years.6' Researchers at Tufts University have estimated
the average cost to a pharmaceutical company of developing a new drug,
reaching the figure of $1.04 billion in 2013 dollars for the 1983 to 1994
period and more recently reaching the figure of $2.6 billion in 2013 dol-
• 65
lars for the 1995 to 2007 period. (This number reflects the cost of first
approval for entirely new drugs, not the cost of subsequent innovation,
like the development of new indications or formulations.) By way of
comparison, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) reported in 2009 that
generic non-biological drug applications typically take three to five years
to assemble, with a corresponding cost of one to five million dollars.'(
Cir. 1996) (describing the ANDA process as permitting a "generic producer of the
fully tested drug to rely on the safety and efficacy data of a prior applicant"); Am.
Bioscience Inc. v. Thompson, 141 F. Supp. 2d 88, 91 (D.D.C. 2001) ("In other words,
the generic manufacturer is allowed to rely on the safety and effectiveness data
submitted in the pioneer's NDA."), rev'd, 269 F.3d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Pfizer, Inc.
v. FDA, 753 F. Supp. 171, 172 (D. Md. 1990) (explaining that ANDA applicants are
"permitted... to rely on the safety and effectiveness data submitted by the 'pioneer'
drug manufacturer with its NDA"); Glaxo, Inc. v. Heckler, 623 F. Supp. 69, 72
(E.D.N.C. 1985) (stating that ANDA applicants "may rely on existing data and
information on file with the FDA in order to satisfy the safety and efficacy
requirements of federal food and drug law").
See Press Release, Tufts Ctr. for the Study of Drug Dev., Cost to Develop and
Win Marketing Approval for a New Drug is $2.6 Billion (Nov. 18, 2014),
http://csdd.tufts.edu/news/complete-story/prtufts_csdd_2014_cost-study. Nearly
20 years ago, the FDA placed the timeline at eight and a half years. See CTR. FOR DRUG
EVAL. & RESEARCH, FDA, FROM TEST TUBE TO PATIENT: IMPROVING HEALTH
THROUGH HUMAN DRUGS 21 (Sept. 1999), http://www.canceractionnow.org/
FromTestTubeToPatient.pdf.
" See Press Release, supra note 64; see also Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of
Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 180
(2003). More than half of the total cost reflects out-of-pocket clinical testing costs,
which have nearly doubled since the earlier window. The researchers attribute this to
increased clinical trial complexity, larger trial sizes, and changes in clinical trial
protocol design (including design changes to gather information about cost
effectiveness and comparative effectiveness, which are increasingly required by payers
and health technology assessment bodies). Id. at 177-81.
6FTC, EMERGING HEALTH CARE ISSUES: FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGIC DRUG
COMPETITION, at iii (June 2009), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
reports/emerging-heath-care-issues-follow-biologic-drug-competition-federa-trade-
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These numbers suggest generic applicants benefit from a 50% to 75%
reduction in time required and a more than 500-fold reduction in cost.
The Tufts research draws criticism, in part because it relies on pro-
prietary data.6? But in 2006, an economist and research analyst at the FIFC
independently replicated the Tufts estimates, using a publicly available
data set. They found considerable variation with costs varying from
around $500 million to more than $2 billion, depending on the therapy
and the company."' And there is good reason to assume variation in the
length of research and development period as well, with some well-
documented examples like Avastin (bevacizumab) for colorectal cancer
substantially exceeding 12 years. 69 Without a doubt, there is a considera-
ble amount of variation in the length of the research and development
period as well. The FDA's requirements vary by drug class and indication;
a cardiovascular drug may require a large number of trial subjects and
mortality and morbidity endpoints that inherently entail longer trials, for
instance, whereas a cancer drug may be approvable after phase II on the
strength of surrogate endpoints which can be measured more quickly
(such as tumor shrinkage or a short extension in lifespan).
Like generic drug applications under the FDCA, biosimilar applica-
tions under the PHSA should be faster and cheaper than pioneer appli-
cations. But because the scheme is so new, we have very little information
commission-report/p083901biologicsreporLpdf. This estimate is repeated in the
academic literature. See, e.g., Kristina M. Lybecker, Essay: When Patents Aren't Enough:
Why Biologics Necessitate Data Exclusivity Protection, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. Rv. 1427, 1436
(2014).
67 See, e.g., Donald W. Light & Rebecca N. Warburton, Extraordinary Claims Require
Extraordinary Evidence, 24J. HEALTH ECON. 1030, 1031-32 (2005); Donald W. Light &
Rebecca Warburton, Demythologizing the High Costs of Pharmaceutical Research, 6
Biosocieties 34 (2011); see also Cynthia M. Ho, Drugged Out: How Cognitive Bias Hurts
Drug Innovation, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 419, 448-57 (2014) (arguing that cognitive
biases pervade discussion of drug development costs, affecting the widely cited Tufts
numbers and possibly affecting its critics as well).
m See Christopher P. Adams & Van V. Brantner, Estimating the Cost of New Drug
Development: Is It Really $802 Million?, 25 HEALTH AFFAIRS 420, 427 (2006). The
authors also observe that: (a) drug development costs vary greatly even among the
largest pharmaceutical firms; (b) some difference is attributable to differences in
success rates and duration of testing necessary among the various therapeutic
categories; (c) FDA regulatory policy itself can and does reduce development costs, as
it has done with respect to HIV/AIDS drugs; and (d) "some of the estimated costs
could be attributable to the strategic decisions of the drug firms themselves." Id. at
424-47.
See, e.g., Henry Grabowski, Data Exclusivity for New Biological Entities 10 (Duke
Univ. Dept. of Econ. Working Paper, 2007), http://public.econ.duke.edu/Papers/
PDF/DataExclusivityWorkingPaper.pdf (noting that approval of Avastin came 15
years after a Genentech scientist discovered the existence of vascular endothelial
growth factor, a protein that helps grow blood vessels and can help cancers grow and
spread). The phase III trial in metastatic colorectal cancer took three years. Id.
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about the time and costs involved for these applications. Before the
statute was enacted but after its regulatory provisions had been finalized,
the FTC estimated that biosimilars would take 8 to 10 years to develop,
with a corresponding cost of $100 to $200 million."' This suggests a mod-
est reduction in the time involved but perhaps a 90% decrease in finan-
cial burden (taking the top-end figures for both, from $2 billion to $200
million). But the statutory requirements for biosimilar approval are more
discretionary than the ANDA provisions and will inherently vary with the
complexity of the reference product. 2 Some companies have been
turned away at early meetings with the agency due to deficiencies in their
analytical data, 3 for instance, and one experienced biosimilar sponsor
faced unexpected review issues that seem to have slowed approval and
undoubtedly are increasing cost." It may therefore be difficult to gener-
ate a meaningful "average" cost for biosimilars. Further, because the reg-
ulatory requirements will almost certainly lessen over time as the FDA
gains experience with the scheme and as analytical methodology im-
proves, as they have in Europe since its biosimilar pathway launched in
2006, average costs may decrease over time.
'0 Only one biosimilar had been approved at the time of drafting, although
several more applications were pending. See Christopher J. Betti et al., FDA Accepts
First Biosimilar Application Filed Under Section 351(k) of the Public Health Service Act,
K&L GATES (July 28, 2014), http://www.klgates.com/fda-accepts-first-biosimilar-
application-filed-under-section-351 k-of-the-public-health-services-act-07-28-2014/.
"' See FTC, supra note 66, at 14; see also Henry Grabowski et al., Implementation of
the Biosimilar Pathway: Economic and Policy Issues, 41 SETON HALL. L. REv. 511, 522
(2011) (noting that research and development for complex biosimilars might take
eight years and range in cost from $100 to $150 million). Other estimates are higher.
See, e.g., George Dranitsaris et al., Biosimilars of Biological Drug Therapies: Regulatory,
Clinical and Commercial Considerations, 71 DRUGS 1527, 1533-34 (2011)
("Manufacturing and development costs for some of the first-generation approved
biosimilars [have] been estimated to be [$75] to [$250] million. For more complex
monoclonal antibodies, costs of up to [$500] million have been projected." (footnote
omitted)).
n The European Medicines Agency (EMA) has issued guidelines explaining the
requirements for biosimilar medicine applications by product class. See Scientific
Guidelines on Biosimilar Medicines, EUR. MEDS. AGENCY (2015), http://www.ema.
europa.eu/ema/index.jsp?curl=pages/regulation/general/general-content_000408.
jsp.
7 See FDA's Latest Biosimilar Guidance Lays Out Expectations for Sponsor Meetings,
FDA WEEK (April 5, 2013) ("[L]ast year an FDA biosimilar official said the agency was
turning away some sponsors because they lacked the necessary analytical data....").
71 M. Nielsen Hobbs, Celltrion's Biosimilar User Fee Deadline Passes with Conspicuous
Silence, PHARMA & MEDTEcH Bus. INTELL.: PINK SHEET DAILY, (June 9, 2015),
https://www.pharmamedtechbi.com/publications/the-pink-sheet-daily/2015/6/9/
celltrions-biosimilar-user-fee-deadline-passes-with-conspicuous-silence.
71 See Henry Grabowski & Erika Lietzan, FDA Regulation of Biosimilars, in FDA IN
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: THE CHALLENGES OF REGULATING DRUGS AND NEW
TECHNOLOGIES 414, 428-29 (Holly Fernandez Lynch & I. Glenn Cohen eds., 2015).
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The question of how much faster and cheaper a generic or biosimi-
lar drug application might be, as compared to the reference-product ap-
plication, is important when considering likely market behaviors in a re-
16designed exclusivity scheme, but it does not matter to the basic point
being made in this Section about data exclusivity. The point is that data
exclusivity can be understood as a period of time during which regulatory
barriers to market entry are symmetrical-in other words, all applicants
seeking to market a particular molecule (or variations thereof) face the
same regulatory burden of demonstrating safety and efficacy through a
full preclinical and clinical research and development program, which
the applicants perform, fund, or purchase.
C. The Myth of Exclusivity
When the narrative is recast, the central myth of exclusivity is ex-
posed; it is not a grant of anything to anyone. Data exclusivity is the ab-
sence of an abbreviated pathway. It does not prevent subsequent entrants
from doing exactly what the first entrant did--developing the product,
testing it, submitting a full application, and launching the drug, subject
to relevant patent and business considerations.7 Contrasting data exclu-
sivity with market exclusivity should make this clear.
Orphan-drug exclusivity is the main example in current U.S. law of
market exclusivity. An orphan drug is intended to treat a rare disease or
condition; the sponsor makes this showing by demonstrating that the dis-
ease affects fewer than 200,000 persons in this country or that the com-
pany does not expect to recover its costs of research and development
when marketing the product. If a drug has been designated as an or-
phan drug, then-upon approval-it is entitled to seven years of market
exclusivity. 9 This means the FDA may not approve the same drug for the
same condition for seven years, even if proposed in a full application
supported by original research.80 Orphan-drug exclusivity is an affirma-
tively granted right, in the sense that it prevents subsequent entrants
from doing what they would ordinarily and otherwise be permitted to
76 See infra Section III.
77 See Elizabeth H. Dickinson, FDA's Role in Making Exclusivity Determinations, 54
FoOD & DRUG L.J. 195, 200 (1999) ("The five-year exclusivity provision does not
prohibit FDA from accepting another full competitor NDA if the sponsor of the
second application has done all the work itself."). When she wrote this article, Ms.
Dickinson was Associate Counsel for Drugs at FDA. She is now the agency's Chief
Counsel.
78 SeeFDCA, 21 U.S.C. §§ 360bb(a)(1)-(2) (2012).
7 Id. § 360cc(a).
See id.; see also Berlex Labs., Inc. v. FDA, 942 F. Supp. 19, 23 (D.D.C. 1996)
(noting that the Orphan Drug Act "precludes the grant of FDA approval to other
manufacturers of the same drug intended for treatment of the same disease").
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do-study the molecule themselves and reach the market on the same
terms as the first entrant.
Another example of market exclusivity is the 180-day exclusivity
awarded to the first generic applicants to challenge a particular innova-
tor's patent (as invalid or not infringed) in its ANDA.8' Like orphan ex-
clusivity and unlike data exclusivity, it bars subsequent similarly situated
applicants-other generic companies challenging the innovator's pa-
tents-from obtaining approval on the same terms for a fixed period of
time. Subsequent applicants who similarly challenged the patent and
whose products are otherwise approvable must wait. A third example is
the exclusivity granted to the first biosimilar sponsor to demonstrate its
biosimilar interchangeable with a particular reference product. For a pe-
riod of time after FDA finds this product interchangeable, no other bio-
similar product may be deemed interchangeable with the same reference
product-even if the applicant has performed comparable research and
• 82
made the same showing. It may be fair to call orphan exclusivity, 180-
day exclusivity, and interchangeability exclusivity patent-like rights,83 in
the sense that they block others who would otherwise do the same thing,
by virtue of an affirmative step taken by Congress (i.e., as of now, others
may not do what you did). But one cannot fairly say the same of data exclu-
Sivity.84 Data exclusivity does not prevent competitors from doing the
same thing the pioneer did. And this is why the terminology dispute-
data versus market exclusivity-matters. Using the phrase market exclusivity
to describe a regulatory scheme in which competitors are in fact free to
exploit the market using the same pathway for their competing products
(including replicas) perpetuates the myth of exclusivity.
" See 21 U.S.C., § 355(j) (5) (B) (iv). See generally David E. Korn, Erika Lietzan &
Shaw W. Scott, A New History and Discussion of 180-Day Exclusivity, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
335 (2009); Erika Lietzan & David E. Korn, Issues in the Interpretation of 180-Day
Exclusivity, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 49 (2007); Erika King Lietzan, 2004 Update: 180-Day
Exclusivity Under the Hatch-Waxman Amendments to the Federal Food, Drumg and Cosmetic
Act, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 459 (2004); Erika King Lietzan, A Brief Histoy of 180-Day
Exclusivity Under the Hatch-Waxman Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 287 (2004).
2 42 U.S.C. § 262(k) (6) (2012). At the time this Article was written, no sponsor
of a biosimilar had proven its product interchangeable, and thus no exclusivity had
been awarded.
8 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and Regulatory Exclusivity, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF THE BIOPHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 167, 184
(Patricia M. Danzon & Sean Nicholson eds., 2012) ("Market exclusivity under the
Orphan Drug Act is similar to a patent on a particular use of a drug, enforced by
FDA, with the drug narrowly defined to exclude 'clinically superior' formulations.").
8' See TREVOR M. COOK, THE PROTECTION OF REGULATORY DATA IN
PHARMACEUTICAL AND OTHER SECTORS 4 (2000); Ian Dodds-Smith, Data Protection and
Abridged Applications for Marketing Authorisations in the Pharmaceutical Industry, in
PHARMACEUTICAL MEDICINE, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND EUROPEAN LAw 93, 100 (Richard
Goldberg &Julian Lonbay eds., 2000).
2016]
LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW
It should not be assumed that this is a simple fiction-in other words
that regulatory symmetry (subjecting all applicants to the same rules) is
purely hypothetical, and in fact the pioneer always has a non-competitive
marketplace entirely to itself. Indeed, there would be no need for orphan
exclusivity-preventing the FDA from approving full applications for the
same drug for seven years-if the threat of full applications for duplicates
were not real. Whether second and third applicants do-or with a
change in the length or nature of exclusivity would-seek approval for
duplicates (or slight variations) on the basis of full applications is a com-
plex question. The answer almost certainly depends on a variety of fac-
tors.
To begin with, in the non-biological drug world, second entrants do
not often compete with identical products during the data exclusivity pe-
riod. This can be attributed to patent protection in many cases, and in
almost every case probably also to the fact that it is less expensive and
more rational to wait the brief period (five years, or four with a patent
challenge) until the shortcut pathway opens. There are, however, some
examples; the FDA has approved multiple comparable-in-scope new drug
applications for hyaluronidase, levothyroxine, recombinant somatropin,
and norethindrone, for instance. Generating a full list of examples and
understanding their stories would be helpful.s5 But in the end, we have a
thin historical record to shed light on market behavior in the absence of
a ready generic-drug pathway; as already noted, generic drugs have been
legally possible and marketed since enactment of the FDCA in 1938,
through the old drug pathway until the late 1970s and via ANDAs (albeit
only for copies of pioneer products that reached the market before 1962)
after that. As for biological drugs, it is less clear that a 12-year exclusivity
period will always make waiting for an abbreviated pathway the most ra-
tional choice for a second entrant hoping to market a replica.
But even if subsequent entrants shy away from duplicates due to pa-
tent protection (or the irrationality of preparing a full application a mere
four years before abbreviated applications are permitted), the pioneer
may face competitive pressures during the data-exclusivity period with re-
spect to both price and product features. That is, patent protection on
the pioneer's product may drive second entrants toward non-infringing
variations or, indeed, competing products in the same drug class, which
would presumably compete-to the benefit of patients and payers-on
the basis of differentiating features as well as price. Vigorous competition
" At least some of these are probably idiosyncratic situations; for instance, it
made sense to file NDAs for recombinant somatropin, because the FDA was not
prepared to approve abbreviated applications as a scientific matter until 2006-and
even then approved only a 505(b)(2) application that contained extensive data,
rather than an ANDA. This was Omnitrope, discussed supra note 62 and infra note
149.
, See supra Section II.A.3.
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within a new class of non-biological drugs recently approved to treat
chronic Hepatitis C infection indicates that in the absence of pressure
from a substitutable generic, prompt in-class competition from an inno-
vator can place substantial pressure on first-entrant prices. These drugs
represented a paradigm shift in treatment of HCV infection, blocking a
protein needed by the virus to replicate. 8' Gilead Sciences obtained ap-
proval of Sovaldi (sofosbuvir) and Harvoni (ledipasvir/sofosbuvir) in De-
cember 2013 and October 2014, respectively. These drugs began with list
prices of more than $80,000 for 12 weeks of treatment. AbbVie obtained
approval of its Viekira Pak (ombitasvir/paritaprevir/ritonavir) in De-
cember 2014, at which point purchasers of each began to extract signifi-
cant discounts in exchange for exclusive contracts.
Review of innovation in the biological marketplace from 1986 (licen-
sure of the first recombinant biological product) to 2010 (when abbrevi-
ated biologics applications were authorized by law) might offer addition-
al examples and valuable insights on second-entrant behavior during the
data-exclusivity term. This review would need to take into account the
strategic impact of both the patent landscape and orphan exclusivity. The
nature of the patent protection-a simple composition of matter patent,
on the one hand, versus a foundational technology claim, on the other
hand-presumably will affect the second-in-class strategies available to
second entrants. And the FDA's willingness to make exceptions to or-
phan exclusivity-by characterizing a second entrant's proposed use as
different even if it varies only slightly, for instance, or by characterizing
the second entrant's drug as different on account of claims of clinical su-
periority (for instance, fewer injection-site reactions)-will also affect
strategies.
But there are interesting stories to explore. For instance, with only a
full-application option on the table, two companies raced to clone the
hormone erythropoietin for administration to patients with anemia; a pa-
tent ruling ultimately meant that only Amgen-and not Chugai-would
market in the United States. 89 Genzyme and Transkaryotic Therapies also
" See Press Release, FDA, FDA Approves Sovaldi for Chronic Hepatitis C
(Dec. 6, 2013), http://www.fda.gov/newsevents/newsroom/pressannouncements/
ucm377888.htm.
See, e.g., Caroline Humer, UnitedHealth Backs Gilead's Harvoni as Preferred
Hepatitis C Treatment, Reuters (Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/
unitedhealth-gilead-hepatitisc-idUSL1NOV72GD20150128; Samantha Liss, Express
Scripts to Drop Hepatitis Drug Sovaldi, Offer Competing Viekira Pak, ST. Louis PosT-
DiSPATCH (Dec. 21, 2014), http://www.stltoday.com/business/local/express-scripts-
to-drop-hepatitis-c-drug-sovaldi-offer-competing/article_7363d48e-a79e-5bda-8198-
3090c17876d5.html; Meg Tirrell, Gilead Fights Back: CVS to Cover Its Hepatitis C Drugs
Exclusively, CNBC (Jan. 5, 2015), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/01/05/gilead-inks-deal-
with-cvs-to-cover-its-hepatitis-c-drugs-exclusively htmil.
" See Robert A. Bohrer & John T. Prince, A Tale of Two Proteins: The FDA's
Uncertain Interpretation of the Orphan Drug Act, 12 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 365, 388-89
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raced to market with agalactosidase alpha products for Fabry's disease;
Genzyme entered the market alone on account of orphan designation
and receiving approval first, but not on account of patent protection. 90
These and other examples could be explored more deeply. It is possible
that with a long enough delay before available shortcuts, second entrants
will generate copies as well as second-in-class and third-in-class products
(creating price and feature competition); and it is possible that crowded
classes (or a brief delay before shortcuts open) will prompt industry to
pursue new lines of research and development.
This competitive marketplace during data exclusivity contrasts with
the marketplace after the second pathway opens. Once the shortcut
pathway opens, generic drugs generally obtain their market share by op-
eration of state law, rather than through active competition for freely
choosing consumers. Specifically, the FDA awards every approved generic
drug product a therapeutic equivalence rating, indicating the agency's
judgment whether the generic can be substituted for the pioneer prod-
uct. In the absence of a change to route of administration, dosage form,
or strength, a generic drug receives an "A" rating-signaling that the two
products can be expected to have the same clinical profile and the gener-
ic can therefore be substituted without the intervention of healthcare
providers.9' Under state law, the generic drug is then generally substitut-
ed at the point of sale, even when a physician prescribes the pioneer
drug.92 This has a profound impact on the pioneer's market share. A re-
cent case study of six drugs that lost exclusivity between 2009 and 2013
found it took on average three months for generic penetration to reach
60% . Further, even where substitution does not drive market share, it
(1999).
'0 See Andrew Pollack, A Genzyme Drug Receives Qualified Support, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
14, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/14/business/a-genzyme-drug-wins-
qualified-support.html; see also Claire Cassedy & James Love, Timeline for Fabrazyme,
Replaga, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT'L (July 14, 2014), http://keionline.org/sites/
default/files/ReplagalFabrazyme Timeline.pdf.
"' FDA, APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE
EVALUATIONS, at vii (35th ed. 2015). This FDA list is commonly known as the Orange
Book.
The laws of the states are written differently, with some permitting substitution
at the pharmacist's discretion and others requiring substitution (though subject to
physician override, the precise wording of which varies), and some referencing
therapeutic equivalence determinations in the Orange Book and others not. See infra
note 100.
" See Murray L. Aitken et al., The Regulation of Prescription Drug Competition and
Market Responses: Patterns in Prices and Sales Following Loss of Exclusivity 1 (Nat'l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19487, 2013) (finding that "compared with
the 1980s and 1990s, the speed with which generics have gained market share...
following [loss of exclusivity] has accelerated").
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remains a myth that generic companies offer horizontal competition to
innovators. 94
The biosimilar marketplace will operate differently in the near term
because the cost of generating biosimilars will be more substantial and
because biosimilars will not initially earn therapeutic equivalence ratings
(called "interchangeability" determinations in the PHSA) .2 Competition
between reference products and biosimilars will probably resemble tradi-
tional brand-to-brand competition at first, with biosimilar sponsors
branding and promoting their medicines and initial savings being mod-
est.96 But this is likely to be a short-term to medium-term state of affairs.
The FDA has suggested ways to reduce the clinical-testing burden on bio-
similar applicants," and analytical methodology may improve sufficiently
over the next decade to reduce that burden even further. The agency has
also begun considering what will be needed for interchangeability de-
terminations,") some companies are conducting switching trials, 9 and
state legislatures have begun amending their laws to accommodate bio-
similar substitution.' ° Eventually the biosimilar marketplace may resem-
ble the generic drug marketplace, in which case there will not be mean-
ingful brand-to-brand-style price and feature competition after the
" Emily Michiko Morris, The Myth of Generic Pharmaceutical Competition Under the
Hatch-Waxman Act, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 245, 278 (2012)
(arguing that generic manufacturers are not horizontal competitors to brand-name
pharma for a variety of reasons, including that "private insurers and other third-party
payers not only interrupt the chain between patient consumers and pharmaceutical
manufacturers but also skew the demand for those pharmaceuticals").
"' See, e.g., FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: BIOSIMILARS: ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS
AND ANSWERS REGARDING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BIOLOGICS PRICE COMPETITION
AND INNOVATION ACT OF 2OO9, at 7 (drft. May 2015), http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/Drugs/.. ./Guidances/UCM273001.pdf ("At this time, it would be
difficult as a scientific matter for a prospective biosimilar applicant to establish
interchangeability in an original 351(k) application given the statutory standard for
interchangeability and the sequential nature of that assessment. FDA is continuing to
consider the type of information sufficient to enable FDA to determine that a
biological product is interchangeable with the reference product"); see also
Grabowski & Lietzan, supra note 75, at 428-29.
See generally Grabowski & Lietzan, supra note 75.
See, e.g., SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERATIONS GUIDANCE, Supra note 37, at 7.
See Guidance Agenda: New & Revised Draft Guidances CDER Is Planning to Publish
During Calendar Year 2015 (April 28, 2015), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
drugs/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/guidances/ucm4l7290.pdf.
"' See Study into Switching from Aranesp to Biosimilar Epoetin Alfa, GENERICS &
BIOSIMILARS INITIATIVE (July 11, 2014), http://gabionline.net/Biosimilars/News/
Study-into-switching-from-Aranesp-to-biosimilar-epoetin-alfa; see also Study of
Haemodialysis Patients Switching from Aranesp to Biosimilar, CLINICALTRIALS.GOV (June 3,
2015), https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/NCT02191150.
'00 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 2549A (2015); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 465.0252
(West 2015); IND. CODE § 16-42-25-5 (2015); N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-02.1-14.3
(2015); UTAH CODE § 58-17b-605.5 (2015).
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shortcut pathway opens, but instead non-competitive substitution by
pharmacies and payers.
Further, at least in the biological drug marketplace, it is possible that
even after the second pathway opens, some competitors will choose to file
full applications rather than abbreviated applications. Specifically, both
regulatory and intellectual property considerations could prompt spon-
sors to file full applications for their replicas of pioneer biological drugs.
The PHSA requires a biosimilar biological product to be highly similar to
its reference product, and it precludes clinically meaningful differences
between the two.'01 The biosimilar must also have the same route of ad-
ministration, dosage form, and strength as its reference product, and its
"conditions of use" must have been approved for the reference prod-
uct.102 The statute thus presents a stark choice: file a biosimilar applica-
tion striving to be as similar as possible to the reference product, or file a
full application supported by a full complement of preclinical and clini-
cal trials.
The tradeoff is complex, with advantages and disadvantages to each
pathway. For instance, the FDA has decided that a biosimilar applicant
may in many cases submit clinical data for only one indication and justify
approval for all reference product indications-an advantageous process
known as extrapolation.' 3 In addition, as noted, the PHSA authorizes is-
suance of interchangeability determinations for biosimilars if certain
showings are made, and this will eventually lead to substitution under
state pharmacy law. The benefits of extrapolation and interchangeability
for biosimilars may, for some companies, outweigh the disadvantage of
being limited to the innovator's indications and other conditions of use.
For other companies, they may not, and whether they do may depend on
the number of indications at issue (and their cost to prove as well as their
value in the marketplace) and on the therapeutic class (including how
crowded the class is).
Until recently, there had also been a question whether the pre-
market patent litigation provisions of the PHSA would push companies to
full applications instead of abbreviated applications because many inter-
preted these provisions as requiring the biosimilar applicant to provide a
copy of its application to the innovator. 1°4 Although an initial court ruling
,' 42 U.S.C. § 262(i) (2012).
,2 Id. § 262(k) (2) (A) (i) (III)-(V). The phrase "conditions of use" encompasses
all circumstances described in approved labeling related to use of an approved
product, e.g., indications, dosing regimens, dosing instructions, dose levels, strengths,
frequency of administration, durations of use, routes of administration, dosage forms,
monotherapy versus concomitant therapy, first-line versus second-line therapy, and so
forth.
OS SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERATIONs GUIDANCE, supra note 37, at 21.
E.g., FDA Says It Prefers, but Can't Mandate, Firms Utilize Biosimilars Pathway, FDA
WEEK (Dec. 17, 2010) (noting that several firms developing biosimilar-like products
[Vol. 20:1
THE MYTHS OF DATA EXCLUSIVITY
indicates otherwise, the dispute may not yet be fully resolved. If a com-
pany concludes that it prefers the full pathway, recasting the biosimilar
application as a full application may be feasible, provided the submitted
studies standing alone fully establish the safety and effectiveness of the
proposed product. Indeed, soon after enactment of the BPCIA, the FDA
approved a full application for Teva's filgrastim product, though the very
same product had been authorized as a biosimilar in Europe on the basis
of largely the same application. 6 This is an area that will need to be
watched closely.
In brief, a variety of patent, regulatory, and business considerations
may drive subsequent entrants toward, or away from, a full application
for a "copy" (or instead a "tweaked" version, or even instead a second-in-
class product) in the years following pioneer approval when all comers
are subject to the same license requirements.' °7 The decision in any par-
indicated they might not file their applications under the new pathway, citing
"drawbacks" including the patent litigation provisions).
105 SeeAmgen, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 794 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
... See Grabowski & Lietzan, supra note 75, at 427. The application had been
submitted prior to enactment of the BPCIA, when only the full pathway was available
but, as a practical matter, it could presumably have been withdrawn and resubmitted
under the new pathway.
107 There is an important additional question whether ethical considerations
affect the decision to proceed with a full application. See, e.g., CoRRE, supra note 55,
at 5-6 ("If the regulatory body is not free, when assessing a file, to use all the
knowledge available to it, including data from other files and published information,
a great deal of repetitive toxicological and clinical investigation will be required, which
will be wasteful and in the case of animal testing, ethically questionable."); Lemmens
& Telfer, supra note 56, at 85 ("This will be particularly ethically problematic in the
case of healthy subjects research and when patients are asked to participate in
placebo-controlled trials."); Peter K. Yu, The Political Economy of Data Protection 84
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 777, 784-85 (2010) (stating that "commentators have found the
need for data exclusivity laws economically dubious" because "[it is also wasteful and
highly undesirable to require duplicative testing in countries that have very limited
economic resources" and because "[it is simply immoral to require the use of human
subjects and animals to retest drugs that are considered bioequivalent to those that
have already been approved for the market."). This issue is beyond the scope of this
Article, but preliminary thoughts from a regulatory perspective follow.
First, one concern may be the use of a placebo arm or the randomization of some
study subjects to a different treatment than the one under investigation. Use of the
first approved product as the active control (and approval on the basis of non-
inferiority) should mitigate most of this concern, although it does not alleviate
concerns relating to testing procedures themselves (such as blood draws). A strong
tradition of autonomy in this country with respect to personal healthcare decisions,
combined with the emphasis we place on giving patients and consumers access to
information (i.e., a less paternalistic model of the physician-patient relationship),
may give informed consent a sufficiently mitigating role in this case. See generally
Robert Temple & Susan S. Ellenberg, Placebo-Controlled Trials and Active-Control Trials
in the Evaluation of New Treatments Part 1: Ethical and Scientific Issues, 133 ANNALS OF
INTERNAL MED. 455 (2000). Dr. Temple is a senior medical official at the FDA, where
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ticular case is complex and idiosyncratic, and in some cases, duplicates
may well be marketed. The claim here is that from a regulatory perspec-
tive, subsequent entrants may file full applications for copies or near-
copies. Data exclusivity does not speak to this; it is simply the phrase used
to describe the period of time before a second pathway to market is availa-
ble for their use before they can use the research generated by the pio-
neer to satisfy their own premarket burden.
Recasting data exclusivity in this fashion sheds light on why it is a
mistake to refer to data exclusivity as a discrete element of either the
Hatch-Waxman compromise or the BPCIA compromise. This is not to
say that these statutes were not compromises. They were. In the years
leading to enactment of the generic drug provisions of 1984, for in-
stance, the innovator and generic industries had been seeking separate
reforms. The innovative industry had grown frustrated with the delay in
market entry stemming from the expanded premarket research and de-
velopment requirements attributable to the 1962 drug amendments. Not-
ing that the average effective patent life (actual time on the market with
108
an unexpired patent to exploit) had dropped to 11 or 12 years, they
sought restoration of at least some of the patent term lost to regulatory
requirements. The generic industry sought a mechanism for abbreviated
approval of copies of new drugs approved after the 1962 amendments.
The final legislation provided both. And because it codified an experi-
mental-use exemption to patent infringement for companies preparing
he currently serves as (among other things) Deputy Center Director for Clinical
Science within the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER).
Second, a new drug is never fully understood when approved, nor has it been
proven safe and effective in any absolute sense. Approval means only that its benefits
are thought to outweigh its risks, based on a premarket testing program involving
carefully selected subjects in tightly controlled usage conditions. The risk-benefit
profile of the drug clarifies over time, as the company continues controlled testing
and as data from the real world accumulate. The relative paucity of data at first-
entrant approval might well be sufficient to justify a system of study replication for
some period of time. Arguably, until the molecule is so well understood that
regulators are confident no meaningful new safety or efficacy information will
emerge from controlled clinical testing-indeed perhaps until "old drug" status is
achieved-continued safety and efficacy testing may contribute to social welfare.
This is, indeed, one theory behind the "monitoring" period which substitutes for
data exclusivity in the Pacific Rim countries. Japan, for instance, requires a drug with
a new active ingredient to be the subject of full applications for an eight-year
monitoring period, in part so that the safety and effectiveness of the drug can be
more fully elucidated. See JAPAN PHARM. MFRS. ASS'N, PHARMACEUTICAL
ADMINISTRATION AND REGULATIONS IN JAPAN ch. 4, § 6 (2015), http://www.jpma.
or.jp/english/parj/pdf/2015.pdf; see also INT'L FED'N OF PHARM. MFRS. & ASS'NS,
DATA ExCLUSIVITY: ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENT OF NEW MEDICINES 70 (July 2011).
"" See Bruce N. Kuhlik, The Assault on Pharmaceutical Intellectual Property, 71 U.
CHI. L. REv. 93, 96-97 (2004); James J. Wheaton, Generic Competition and
Pharmaceutical Innovation: The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of
1984, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 433, 451-52 (1986).
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applications,' ° the statute also included an artificial act of patent in-
fringement-submission of an ANDA with the intent to market during
the patent term---giving the innovator an opportunity to enforce its pa-
tent rights before generic market entry." ° The conventional narrative
states that innovators also received the five-year exclusivity term. But this
cannot be right. Instead, subsequent entrants received the right to com-
pete on different (cheaper, less burdensome) terms after five years.
So, too, with the biosimilar statute. Negotiations leading to the en-
actment of the BPCIA were contentious, mainly around the data-
exclusivity provisions."' There is no question that a compromise was
struck. Congress created an abbreviated pathway for approval of biologi-
cal products, which will reduce the cost of market entry to a fraction of
the price paid by first entrants. While the biological drug industry had
already received patent-term restoration in 1984 along with the non-
biologics drug industry, and competitors already had the benefit of the
investigational-use exemption, pioneers now obtained a mechanism for
patent litigation prior to market entry of follow-on products."2 Some de-
scribing the compromise have suggested that the innovative industry also
received 12 years of exclusivity."3 Again, this cannot be right. The innova-
tive industry received nothing, when the four lead senators agreed, in
June 2007, to years of exclusivity."14 The status quo ante was symmetrical
barriers to entry. Data exclusivity is not a "give" to the innovators when it
represents the opening of a second pathway that benefits their competi-
tors.
The analytical error is apparent also when one focuses on the "pig-
gyback" aspect of the abbreviated pathways. When the Hatch-Waxman
amendments were under consideration-putting aside the ineffectual
paper NDA policy-innovators of new drugs approved after 1962 faced
competition only from products approved through full applications. No
one could file a cheaper, faster application to copy their drugs; no one
could rely on their research to support a competing product. Thus, the
decision to permit abbreviated applications five years after NCE approval
ended what had been perpetual enjoyment of the exclusive right of pio-
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2012).
1o See supra Section II.A. 1.
.. The author participated extensively in these negotiations and co-authored an
exhaustive history of the process from 2002 to 2010. See Carver, Elikan & Lietzan,
supra note 9.
112 The structure of the scheme is different, with no public listing of relevant
patents, no 180-day exclusivity for the first to challenge a patent, and no 30-month
stay in the case of timely litigation. And again, as noted, whether this scheme is in fact
mandatory is the subject of ongoing controversy. See supra note 41. One might ask
whether any true compromise remains (i.e., whether the innovative industry received
anything in 2010, after all) if the initial ruling of the Federal Circuit stands.
"' See infra note 116.
114 See Carver, Elikan & Lietzan, supra note 9, at 746.
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neers to their own research. One could say that, in 1984, Congress short-
ened infinite data exclusivity to five years of data exclusivity. So, too, with
the biologics statute. Prior to 2010, the PHSA did not authorize follow-on
applications or reliance on innovator data. The decision to permit ap-
proval of abbreviated applications, relying on innovator data, 12 years af-
ter BIA approval, represented a truncation of what had been perpetual
enjoyment of the exclusive right of BLA owners to their own research.
Congress, in 2010, shortened infinite data exclusivity to 12 years of data
exclusivity. Innovators may well have been relieved it was not shortened
to seven (and this is the reason for the epigram to this Article), but their
starting position had been infinite exclusive rights to their research data.
The myth can lead to analytical mistakes in other settings. For in-
stance, Professor Epstein has made the argument that approval of biosim-
ilar biological drugs constitutes an uncompensated taking of innovator
property (trade secrets).' 5 One response has been that data exclusivity
provides sufficient compensation."6 But this is illogical. The length of the
period of time before a taking cannot logically be compensation for the
taking. Nor is it logical to suggest that income from lawfully exploiting
one's property is compensation for a subsequent taking of the property.
Whatever the merit of Professor Epstein's position on the Fifth Amend-
ment issue, which is beyond the scope of this Article, it cannot be correct
analytically that the exclusivity term might constitute "compensation" for
the taking that Professor Epstein finds.
III. REFRAMED DIALOGUE ABOUT EXCLUSIVITY: NET BENEFIT TO
SOCIETY
Opponents of data exclusivity often seek the high ground by suggest-
ing it is an artificial barrier to entry for the benefit of first applicants. But
this is mythical thinking. This Article proposes an alternative way of
thinking about data exclusivity-as the period of time before the law
115 Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Protection of Trade Secrets and Patents Under
the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 66 FOOD & DRUG LJ. 285
(2011). He argues that innovators with BLAs already approved in 2010 had no
reasonable investment-backed expectation that their data would be used to support
competitor products. Id. at 302-04. And he argues that, although innovators now
have such an expectation, the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine precludes
requiring them to relinquish Fifth Amendment ights in exchange for market entry.
Id. at 313.
... E.g., Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, Comment Letter on Abbott Laboratories
Citizen Petition, at 15-17 (Dec. 24, 2012), http://www.regulations.gov/#l
documentDetail;D=FDA-2012-P-0317-0007 (arguing that the statute "provides just
compensation" in part because of the 12-year exclusivity provision); Michelle L.
Butler, Abbott Petitions FDA on Biosimilars; Argues Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, FDA
L. BLOG (May 17, 2012), http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda law bloghyman-phelps/
2012/05/abbtt-petitins-fda-n-biosimiars-argues-fifth-amendment-takings-cause.htm.
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changes for the benefit of later applicants. Whether, and on what terms,
subsequent entrants will offer marketplace competition to the first en-
trant during this time will depend on a variety of factors, some of which
were explored in the last Section. The insight of Section II is that data
exclusivity does not prevent subsequent entrants from marketing dupli-
cates on the same terms as the first entrant; it is merely the absence of a
pathway for marketing duplicates on different terms. Indeed, as pointed
out, once the law changes for the benefit of subsequent applicants, those
applicants do not compete in the usual sense of the term; generic drugs
generally receive their market share by operation of law, and eventually
biosimilars will do so as well.
The insights from Section II provide the foundation for the analysis
that follows here in Section III. As noted, the goal of this Article is to con-
tribute to an ongoing discussion of the merits of data exclusivity. This
Section therefore takes up the ultimate question: whether, and on what
terms, society derives a net benefit from a period of time during which all
applicants face the same barrier to entry, followed by introduction of a
shortcut reliance-based pathway that allows applicants to reach the mar-
ket on cheaper and faster terms. After concluding that dynamic welfare
considerations call for a period of time before subsequent entrants can
reach the market more cheaply and quickly, this Section discusses the ex-
tent to which patent protection can-and cannot-provide that period of
time. It then presents and assesses differing approaches to data exclusivi-
ty by exploring the fundamental structural differences between the PHSA
and FDCA schemes. This Section demonstrates that exclusivity design
choices themselves are likely to have a profound impact on whether,
when, and on what terms subsequent entrants will compete with the first
entrant.
A. Whether Society Derives a Net Benefit: Public Health and the Incentive to
Innovate
1. Dynamic Public Welfare
There is a compelling public-health case for an abbreviated pathway
that permits reliance on earlier performed research. Generic drugs are
cheaper, and the healthcare finance system has a compelling interest in
lower drug prices. Lower drug prices permit the purchase of additional
healthcare goods and services (for the same patients or, in the case of a
payer, for additional patients), the same healthcare goods and services
for a longer period of time (for the same patients), or even needed non-
healthcare goods and services.' 7 That consumer costs decline dramatical-
'17 According to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, in 2013
Medicare prescription drug expenditures reached $74.647 billion. Medicaid
expenditures reached $21.173 billion, Children's Health Insurance Program
expenditures reached $1.415 billion, Department of Defense expenditures reached
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ly is not disputed.118 The question of increasing overall utilization (i.e.,
whether utilization of the brand plus generic exceeds prior utilization of
the brand alone)-and whether that utilization reflects treatment of pre-
viously untreated patients, as opposed to patients previously treated on
another brand product-turns out to be more complicated. A pioneer
might stop promotion of the branded product when generics reach the
market, which in turn may reduce overall utilization of the molecule. At
the same time, the generic product is much less expensive, and patients
taking other branded products may switch, increasing overall utilization
of the particular molecule and decreasing overall expenditures. The net
effect of these differing pressures on overall utilization of the molecule
may depend on the drug category.19
There is also, however, a compelling public-health case for delay in
the availability of the abbreviated pathway. Few would quarrel with the
proposition that society has a profound need for a continuing flow of
new medicines for currently untreatable and poorly treated diseases like
Alzheimer's disease, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), and many pedi-
atric cancers, and also for chronic diseases that place significant socioec-
onomic stress on patients and families, for diseases of the developing
world, and for common and disabling diseases of aging. In order to en-
sure that pioneers will do the research in question, for the benefit of fol-
low-on applicants and patients, some delay is necessary before that re-
search may be used by others."O Simply put, no company would pay $2
billion for a license if its competitor could pay $5 million immediately af-
terward-even if that competitor did not receive its market share by oper-
ation of law. In economic parlance, one might speak of trading dynamic
efficiency (satisfying the need of future generations of patients for as-yet
$4.803 billion, and Veterans Affairs expenditures reached $2.697 billion. Private
health insurers paid $117.937 billion. Table 19: National Health Expenditures by Type of
Expenditure and Program: Calendar Year 2013, CMS.Gov (Dec. 9, 2014),
http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-
Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/NationalHealthAccountsHistoical.html
(download "NHE Tables" ZIP file).
"' See, e.g., Ernst R. Berndt & Murray L. Aitken, Brand Loyalty, Generic Entry and
Price Competition in Pharmaceuticals in the Quarter Century After the 1984 Waxman-Hatch
Legislation 20 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16431, 2010).
"' See Aitken et al., supra note 93, at 9-11 (noting the "conventional wisdom that
total brand plus generic utilization of a molecule declines following patent
expiration," but recounting contrary precedent where payers switched patients from
Lipitor to generic versions of Zocor, increasing utilization of the latter molecule after
patent expiry). The authors found that "expansion of total molecule sales (brand plus
generic) following [loss of patent exclusivity] is an increasingly common
phenomenon compared with prior observations." Id. at 2-3.
"2' See Memorandum in Support of Defendants Motion for Stay Pending Appeal,
Tummino v. Hamburg, 936 F. Supp. 2d 162 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 12-CV-763
(ERK/VVP)) ("[Elxclusivity provides a critical incentive for drug development that
advances FDA's goal of protecting and promoting public health.").
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undiscovered and undeveloped drugs) for static efficiency (satisfying the
need of the healthcare finance system for cheaper copies of today's
drugs). Due respect for dynamic social welfare would ensure that pio-
neers conducting essential research do not face immediate competition
from companies who omit the research and pay a fraction of the same
price for market entry.
2. The Market Failure Perspective
The law of unfair competition, specifically misappropriation, sug-
gests the same conclusion. The doctrine itself may not be a comfortable
fit here, but its themes resonate when one considers approval of abbrevi-
ated applications. After all, a drug pioneer invests substantial time and
money generating the information that, once submitted to and reviewed
by the FDA, entitles it to enter the marketplace via the licensing process.
When the shortcut opens, a second applicant may use that same infor-
mation without payment to the pioneer to justify its own entry into the
marketplace. It is not coincidence that Amgen recently characterized
Sandoz's biosimilar application as amounting to conversion of Amgen's
property when Sandoz failed to submit to premarket patent-litigation
procedures that Amgen believed were statutorily mandated.12 In essence,
the Amgen complaint suggests a reliance-based application that does not
comply with the compromise legislation of 2010 constitutes nonconsen-
sual use of its earlier research and gives rise to a cause of action sounding
in tort.
The key unfair competition case similarly involves nonconsensual
use of intangible business assets. In International News Service v. Associated
Press (INS), the defendant (INS) took news gathered by the plaintiff (AP)
"as the result of organization and the expenditure of labor, skill, and
money," and sold the news as its own.12 Thus, the defendant was "en-
deavoring to reap where it [had] not sown" and "appropriating to itself
the harvest of those who have sown." 2 3 Here, too, a follow-on drug appli-
cant market entrant reaps where it did not sow, relying instead on the
work performed by a pioneer drug applicant. The case is not on all fours
(except perhaps in the Sandoz example above) because of the whiff of
impropriety on the part of INS, which is absent where a follow-on drug
applicant complies with a scheme that Congress has laid out. Moreover,
many scholars reject the idea that INS lays a foundation for a sweeping
law of unfair competition with respect to information goods. But the
121 See Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., No.14-cv-04741-RS, 2015 WL 1264756, at *8-9
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2015), revd in part, 794 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The Federal
Circuit rejected the conversion theory, in part because it concluded the patent
litigation procedures are not mandatory. See also supra note 41.
12 Int'l News Serv. v. Assoc. Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239-40 (1918).
' Id.; see also Saratoga Vichy Spring Co. v. Lehman, 625 F.2d 1037, 1044 (2d Cir.
1980) ("The essence of an unfair competition claim under New York law is that the
defendant has misappropriated the labors and expenditures of another.").
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case, even if read narrowly, suggests a basis for recovery that finds analogy
in the drug setting.
The value of the news gathered by the Associated Press lay specifical-
ly in the lead time during which it held special value. Appropriation of
the news deprived the AP of its lead-time advantage on the West Coast."4
If permitted too soon, approval of generic drugs and biosimilar biologics
could deprive the first entrant of otherwise inherent lead time. This in-
herent lead time stems from the investment necessary to develop a full
application as the second or third innovator in the queue; if an abbrevi-
ated application is permitted before that time expires, it has eliminated
some natural lead time. For instance, if a second company were to start
the full pathway from scratch following approval of the first entrant's
product, the first entrant's lead time could be two years-the time it may
take to generate a full application from scratch.
This claim about natural lead time requires caveats. First, a second
applicant's timeline may be shorter than the average timeline for new
drug applicants because it can learn things from the public record once
the first entrant's drug is approved. 25 This would truncate the first en-
trant's natural lead time a bit. Second, the second applicant could in theo-
ry start down the full pathway before the first entrant gained approval.
Although it would not (at least initially) have the benefit of public infor-
mation about the first application, it would still presumably receive ap-
proval earlier than had it started after the first entrant's approval. This
would truncate the first entrant's natural lead time as well. All of that
said, with an abbreviated pathway in the law, the data exclusivity term fix-
es a new lead time-five (to seven) years for non-biological new chemical
entities and 12 years for first-licensed biological drugs. Particularly in the
non-biological drug context, this may eliminate years of natural lead
time-in many cases providing at least a rough analogy to !NS. And, of
course, permitting abbreviated applications immediately-without a data
exclusivity term-would eliminate all natural lead time.
Somewhat like misappropriation, the follow-on applicant's reliance
on the pioneer's work-if it occurred too soon-could lead to market
failure. After all, the cost of developing the information in question is
high, and the cost of relying on the information is low. A piggyback ap-
plication would offer consumers a drug product that was identical or
highly similar, and yet the follow-on applicant would be able to price
more cheaply, not having incurred costs comparable to those incurred by
the first entrant. Where given the choice, consumers would purchase (or
payers would require the purchase of) the less expensive of the products.
The result is market failure-essentially because the pioneer is not able
"'4 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 38 cmt. c (Am. Law Inst.
1995).
... See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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to use or exploit the market or license its research to those who are able
to do so.2 6 In the non-biological drug context, the fact that the second
entrant would receive market share by operation of law-specifically, the
combination of FDA therapeutic equivalence ratings and mandatory sub-
stitution under state pharmacy law-rather than the rough and tumble of
a competitive marketplace free of coercion may exacerbate the market
failure.
Preventing market failure-ensuring that pioneers conducting ex-
pensive research do not face immediate competition from companies
who use their research without their consent-may require a sufficient
period of data exclusivity.
3. The Utility of Patents
The preceding Subsections suggest that society will derive a net ben-
efit if pioneers who conduct expensive research to support the safety and
effectiveness of new medicines do not face immediate competition from
other companies marketing duplicates for a fraction of the effort. The
question immediately arises, however, whether patent protection might
provide adequate insulation from this competition. Several points need
to be made in response.
First, the patentability inquiry does not inherently align with the pub-
lic-health inquiry. Public health is not advanced only by medicines that
also happen to satisfy the standard for patent protection-medicines as
to which there is an invention that is novel and non-obvious. For in-
stance, the fact that a person of ordinary skill in the scientific art in ques-
tion might have reasoned his way to a particular molecular configuration
for a particular disease given prior research in the space has no bearing
on whether the public health would be advanced by development of the
molecule in question into a medicine for patients. To give another ex-
ample, an invention might be patent ineligible because the inventor pub-
lished his discovery; again, though, that has no bearing on whether the
public health would be advanced by development of the resultant medi-
cine. The inquiries are fundamentally different, and, with the stakes so
high, patentability should not stand as a proxy for public health benefit.
G Professor Gordon's work limiting the reap/sow principle for intellectual
property through the law of restitution-with a new tort that she calls
"malcompetitive copying"-includes a discussion rationalizing recovery in INS on
roughly these grounds. See Wendy .|. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual
Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REv. 149, 266-73 (1992). For
discussions of Professor Gordon's approach, see also J.H. Reichman & Pamela
Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND. L. Rav. 51, 139-44 (1997),
and Brian F. Fitzgerald & Leif Gamertsfelder, Protecting Informational Products
(Including Databases) Through Unjust Enrichment Law: An Australian Perspective, 20 EUR.
INTELL. PROP. REv. 244,246 (1998).
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Second, despite the vitality of patent protection for the biopharma-
ceutical sector, 12 some core doctrines of patent law are poorly suited to
the scientific and regulatory realities faced by drug pioneers. To begin
with, the U.S. patent term of 20 years from application does not align
with the economic life cycle of a new drug, given the lengthy research
and development period necessary to satisfy FDA approval requirements.
Specifically, as Professor Eisenberg points out, various patent-law doc-
trines (such as the obviousness requirement) effectively force drug spon-
sors to file early patent applications, but these run the risk of failing utili-
ty and enablement challenges given the paucity of data and information
• 128
early in their life cycles. Earlier-filed patent applications also result in a
shorter effective patent life, reducing the value of the patent.'9 Professor
Roin notes that novelty and non-obviousness standards sometimes pre-
clude socially valuable drugs from being patented at all and argues that
this deters pioneers from moving forward with development° And Pro-
fessors Adelman and Holman have concluded that the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) applies a heightened written-description re-
quirement to biopharmaceutical patents, a practice that arguably was
buttressed by the Federal Circuit in 2010."' Recent Supreme Court cases
127 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Shifting Functional Balance of Patents and Drug
Regulation, HEALTH AF., Sept. 2001, at 119, 120 (noting that drugs provide "as clear a
success story for patents in promoting investment in innovation as may be found in
any industry").
,28 See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 56, at 351-52 (pointing out that "patent law
promotes early filing of patent applications ... typically years before the first
commercial marketing of a drug"); id. at 348 (noting that applications for
.composition of matter" patents are filed before clinical testing of a molecule
begins). Professor Eisenberg has also pointed out that, with increased patenting of
inventions related to early-stage biomedical research, relevant patents may
correspond less closely to product markets, shifting monopoly rents away from drug
developers. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALEJ. HEALTH POL'Y L.
& ETHICS 717, 720-23 (2005).
"2 See supra text accompanying notes 108-109 for discussion of effective patent
life prior to enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments. See also Henry G.
Grabowski & John M. Vernon, Effective Patent Life in Pharmaceuticals, 19 INT'LJ. TECH.
MGMT. 98, 110 (2000) (finding a mean effective patent life of 11.7 years for drugs
approved from 1990 to 1995). Patent term restoration only partially addresses this
problem because it restores only half a day for each day spent in clinical testing and
restores none of the time prior to clinical trials. See 35 U.S.C. § 156(c) (2012).
"0 Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87 TEX.
L. REv. 503, 569-70 (2009) (arguing ultimately for an extension in exclusivity in
order to capture unpatentable drugs). But see Kevin Outterson, Comment, Death from
the Public Domain ?, 87 TEx. L. Rxv. SEE ALso 45 (2009), http://www.texaslrev.com/wp-
content/uploads/Outterson-87-TLRSA-45.pdf (challenging the major example
offered by Professor Roin and offering alternative solutions to the free-rider problem
including government funding of clinical trials).
' See generally David E. Adelman & Christopher M. Holman, Misplaced Fears in the
Legislative Battle over Affordable Biotech Drugs, 50 IDEA-INTELL. PRop. L. REv. 565
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on subject-matter eligibility, calling into question the availability of pa-
tents for products of nature, may also hit the biologics space hard.
3 2
Whether it would be possible to fix patent law to address these problems
is unclear; our international treaty obligations generally require patent
law to remain technologically neutral.
33
To this analysis, one might add the fact that patents reward inven-
tion, while data exclusivity facilitates recoupment of investment in an en-
tirely different process-not the invention process, but the subsequent
testing necessary to bring the invention to patients.13 The fundamental
tradeoff of patent law is the provision of exclusive rights to make, use, or
sell an invention for a fixed period of time, in exchange for an enabling
public disclosure of the invention. But society has a profound need for
the patented invention to be not only disclosed but brought forward in safe
(2010). In 2007, Professor Holman surveyed court cases and patent office decisions,
finding no heightened written-description requirement for biotechnology-derived
drugs. In a later piece, however, he and Professor Adelman noted subsequent legal
developments that might change this conclusion-including revised PTO-written
description guidelines that strengthen the written-description requirements for these
inventions, under which PTO may in fact be "applying the written description
requirement as a 'super enablement' standard." Id. at 576-78. The key Federal
Circuit case is Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010). In
this case, the court confirmed en banc that the written-description requirement is
separate from the enablement requirement, and it found that Ariad's patent, which
claimed methods comprising the single step of reducing Nuclear Factor Kappa B
(NF-kB) activity in eukaryotic cells, lacked sufficient written description, at least in
part because the specification failed to disclose how the claimed reduction is achieved
(despite hypothesizing three classes of molecules that could be responsible for the
claimed reduction). Id. at 1340. Although the court denied that the written
description functions as a "super enablement standard," it recognized the uncertainty
of the relationship between structure and function in the biotechnology context and
the resulting difference between "describing an invention and enabling one to make
and use it." See id. at 1352; see also Christopher M. Holman, Maintaining Incentives for
Healthcare Innovation: A Response to the FTC's Report on Follow-On Biologics, 1 1 MINN.J.L.
Sci. & TECH. 755, 774-78 (2010) (explaining, even before Ariad was decided, that his
2007 findings did not support the FTC's conclusion that effective patent protection is
available for biologics).
Professor Holman has also noted unpredictability in patent law-specifically the
proliferation of ambiguous doctrines and the judiciary's tendency to resolve
ambiguities late (and sometimes retroactively)-which he argues has a particularly
harmful effect on biopharmaceutical innovation. Christopher M. Holman,
Unpredictability in Patent Law and Its Effect on Pharmaceutical Innovation, 76 Mo. L. REv.
645, 660-61 (2011). He suggests a longer period of data exclusivity for non-biological
drugs, "along the lines of the twelve years provided for biologic drugs." Id. at 693.
"' See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107,
2111 (2013); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289,
1294 (2012).
131 See Eisenberg, supra note 55, at 486.
' Id. at 487 ("[T]he FDA provides product exclusivity, while the patent system
provides invention exclusivity.").
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and effective form to patients, which requires an additional and burdensome
testing process that is not necessary for the patent itself. Some might ar-
gue that, because federal law erects a barrier to entry, there is no practi-
cal reason to incentivize companies to overcome the barrier; desire to
commercialize the patented invention will provide sufficient incentive.
But the utilitarian point is that, in the absence of any reasonable prospect
of recouping one's investment, no rational actor would invest in the work
necessary to reach the market in the first instance. This is why shortened
effective patent life and weaknesses of patent law in this industry sector
are so problematic.
In brief, important new medicines may not be patentable or have a
meaningful, effective patent life. And there is empirical support for this.
For instance, in 2004 Professor Junod reported that she had reviewed
new drug approvals between 1998 and 2004, finding 22 with NCE data
exclusivity and yet no listed patents, and a 23rd with exclusivity expiring
after the listed patent.13 1 In a prior article, this author listed a number of
drugs approved with new chemical-entity exclusivity but no listed pa-
tents.' m These included Lariam (mefloquine hydrochloride), a synthetic
analog of quinine approved by the FDA in 1989 for the treatment of mild
to moderate acute malaria; Clozaril (clozapine), approved in 1989 for the
management of severely ill schizophrenic patients; Hexalen (altreta-
mine), a chemotherapy agent approved in 1990 for treatment of refrac-
tory ovarian cancer; Leustatin (cladribine), approved in 1993 for the
treatment of active hairy cell leukemia; and Trasylol (aprotinin bovine),
approved in 1993 to reduce bleeding during complex surgeries. Each of
these drugs was important enough to earn priority review at the FDA, a
designation reserved for drugs that represent "significant improvements"
over the standard of care at 
the time.',
Other drugs approved between 1984 and 2010 with NCE exclusivity
138
and no listed patents include: Provocholine (methacholine chloride),
135 Valerie Junod, Drug Marketing Exclusivity Under United States and European Union
Law, 59 FooD & DRUG L.J. 479, 487 (2004); see also Enrique Seoane & Rosa Rodriguez-
Monguio, Effective Patent Life of Antiretroviral Drugs in the U.S. 1987-2007 (iHEA 2007
6th World Congress: Explorations in Health Economics Paper 2007) (noting that of
532 new molecular entities-some of which may not have had new chemical entity
exclusivity-during the study period, 105 did not have listed patents).
'3 SeeLietzan, supra note 13, at 64 n.103.
137 See Priority Review, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/ForPatients/Approvals/Fast/
ucm405405.htm. Three (Hexalem, Leustatin, and Trasylol) also had orphan-drug
exclusivity, which was probably also a factor in the sponsor's investment decision.
13 At this time, the electronic Orange Book shows only unexpired patents and
exclusivity. Consequently, a search performed in a particular month of 2015 is
reliable only with respect to drugs approved since the corresponding month in 2010.
Exclusivity assignments and patent listings for drugs approved between 1984 and
2010 must currently be determined through review of historic copies of the Orange
Book from 1985 to present, which are on file with the author. The FDA may upload
[Vol. 20:1
THE MYTHS OF DATA EXCLUSIVITY
approved in 1986 for the diagnosis of bronchial airway hyper-reactivity in
subjects who do not have clinically apparent asthma; Levatol (penbutolol
sulfate), approved in 1987 for the treatment of mild to moderate arterial
hypertension but since discontinued; Anafranil (clomipramine hydro-
chloride), approved in 1989 to treat obsessive-compulsive disorder;
Optipranolol (metipranolol hydrochloride), approved in 1989 for treat-
ment of open-angle glaucoma and other causes of high pressure inside
the eye; Flumadine (rimantadine hydrochloride), approved in 1993 to
prevent or treat influenza type-A infections; Revex (nalmefene hydro-
chloride), approved in 1995 to partially reverse the effects of narcotics
but since discontinued; Proamatine (midodrine hydrochloride), ap-
proved in 1996 for treatment of orthostatic hypotension but since discon-
tinued; Nilandron (nilutamide), approved in 1999 for use in treating
prostate cancer in men who have/had undergone surgical castration;
Nonniflo (ardeparin sodium), approved in 1997 to prevent blood clot
formation following certain types of surgery but since discontinued; Cor-
lopam (fenoldopam mesylate), approved in 1997 for short-term man-
agement of hypertension in pediatric patients and for short-term man-
agement of severe hypertension in adults when rapid but quickly
reversible emergency reduction of blood pressure is clinically indicated
in an inpatient setting; Infasurf (calfactant), approved in 1998 for the
prevention of respiratory distress syndrome (RDS) in premature infants
at high risk for RDS and for the treatment ("rescue") of premature in-
fants who develop RDS; Celexa (citalopram hydrobromide), approved in
2000 for the treatment of depression; Curosurf (poractant alfa), ap-
proved in 1999 for the treatment of RDS in premature infants; Innohep
(tinzaparin sodium), approved in 2000 for the treatment of acute symp-
tomatic deep vein thrombosis with or without pulmonary embolism when
administered with warfarin sodium; Elestat (epinastine hydrochloride),
approved in 2003 for the prevention of itching associated with allergic
conjunctivitis; and Sanctura (trospium chloride), approved in 2004 for
the treatment of overactive bladder with symptoms of urge urinary incon-
tinence, urgency, and urinary frequency but since discontinued. Several
of these dru s-Provocholine, Anafranil, and Flumadine-received pri-
ority review.
This author more recently also reviewed the electronic Orange Book
database to identify products approved in the years 2011 through 2014
with NCE exclusivity and either no listed patents or listed patents expir-
ing before the NCE exclusivity. This yielded the conclusion that of the
105 new chemical entities approved by the FDA in the four years in ques-
tion, 11 either lacked listed patents or had listed patents expiring before
the exclusivity expired. These included Potiga (ezogabine), approved in
historical information in 2016.
' Proamatine also held orphan-drug exclusivity.
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June 2011 for use in treatment of seizures associated with epilepsy in
adults; Firazyr (icatibant), approved in 2011 for the treatment of acute
attacks of a rare condition called hereditary angioedema (HAE) in peo-
ple ages 18 years and older; Ferriprox (deferiprone), approved in 2011 to
treat patients with iron overload due to blood transfusions in patients
with thalassemia-a genetic blood disorder that causes anemia-who had
an inadequate response to prior chelation therapy; Choline C 11, a posi-
tron emission tomography imaging agent approved in 2012 to help de-
tect recurrent prostate cancer; Dotarem (gadoterate meglumine), a con-
trast agent approved in March 2013 for use with MRI in brain, spine, and
associated tissues in adult and pediatric patients; and Impavido (miltefo-
sine), approved in March 2014 for treatment of (bacterial) leishmania-
ss. 
140
It is reasonable to hypothesize that in these cases the incentive to gen-
erate the research in question may have been provided by the duration of
the statutory period before generics could be approved rather than by
the prospect of patent protection. One limitation to this conclusion is
that the Orange Book does not list patents that claim methods of manufac-
ture, and some of these companies may have relied on-or be relying
on-the protection afforded by such patents. Further, some companies
in the 2011-to-2014 set currently holding data exclusivity may yet obtain
listable patents. Further still, FDA can be slow to publish patents in the
Orange Book even when those patents were timely submitted by the NDA
holder. The Orange Book could still reflect patent listings for some of the
drugs approved at the end of the review window. Finally, in some cases it
is possible the size of the market in question would support only one en-
trant; in other words, the pioneer may also be relying on the relative un-
attractiveness of the market in question to its competitors."'
In terms of exploring the extent to which data exclusivity-rather
than patents-provides the necessary incentive for research and devel-
opment, it may also be worth noting that several products in the 2011-to-
2014 set show listed patents that expire within a few months of data ex-
clusivity. These include Zioptan (tafluprost), approved in February 2012
for reducing elevated intraocular pressure in patients with glaucoma; the
listed patent expires in December 2017, roughly 10 months after the
NCE exclusivity. Another example is Datscan (ioflupane), a priority re-
view imaging drug approved in January 2011 to assist in evaluation of
140 Firazyr had a listed patent expiring in July 2015, but its data exclusivity is
slated to expire in August 2016. Firazyr, Ferriprox, and Impavido also hold orphan
exclusivity. Firazyr earned priority review.
4' One final limitation is that the author did not check every historical Orange
Book to determine whether the applicant listed a patent a few years after approval and
then (for whatever reason) subsequently delisted it. Thus, the list of examples from
1984 to 2010 comprise drugs that received NCE exclusivity and that-at approval and
again one year later-had no patents listed.
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suspected Parkinsonian syndromes; the listed patent expires one month
after data exclusivity. It is harder to know what to make of these exam-
ples, but these companies presumably did not know the precise timing of
their drug approvals when they conducted clinical trials, and it is possible
they, and similar sponsors, were uncertain until the end whether they
would have any patent life that extended past data exclusivity.
Third, the need to enforce patents against follow-on applicants cre-
ates uncertainty, reducing its effectiveness as an incentive. To be fair,
some regulatory provisions reduce the patent enforcement uncertainty
for non-biological drug pioneers. But, it is important not to overstate the
effect of these provisions. First, as already noted, the FDCA provides a 30-
month stay of generic-drug approval while patent litigation unfolds.
Some view this as tantamount to a preliminary injunction, without any
showing of probable success on the merits.1 12 But, the stay is limited to 30
months. Once the stay expires, FDA approval is automatic (assuming the
generic drug is otherwise approvable) and permits the generic company
to market at risk. The generic company will not be precluded from the
market as a regulatory matter unless and until the innovator prevails in
the patent litigation.1 3 Further, the PHSA provides no stay of biosimilar
approval during patent litigation, instead permitting immediate market
entry by biosimilar sponsors. And, there is no statutory preclusion of bio-
similar market entry if the innovator prevails in the patent litigation, leav-
ing the possibility of a reasonable royalty scenario rather than an injunc-
tion of biosimilar marketing.
4
Second, the FDCA reduces uncertainty by delaying the availability of a
shortcut until patent expiry in the event the generic applicant declines to
challenge a particular listed patent. 45 But, the pioneer will not know until
the generic applicant submits its application that the generic has de-
clined to challenge its patent." 6 And there is no such arrangement in the
112 E.g., Eisenberg, supra note 55, at 483-84.
' Once the innovator prevails, the generic applicant must amend its paragraph
IV certification to a paragraph III certification. 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a) (12) (viii) (A)
(2015); see also supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text. Consequently, the FDA may
not approve the generic application until the patent expires. See FDCA, 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(c)(3)(C)(ii) & (j)(5)(B)(ii)(2012); 21 C.F.R § 314.107(b)(3)(B)(iii)(2015).
This is separate from any injunction that the court might issue in the patent
litigation.
,' The scheme requires an injunction of market entry-unlike the FDCA, it does
not preclude FDA approval-if the innovator prevails prior to expiry of the 12-year
exclusivity term. But this subsection considers the role of patents in the absence of
data exclusivity.
FDCA, § 355(c) (3) (C) (ii) & (j) (5) (B) (ii).
Further, the pioneer will know this only if the generic challenges another
patent (which entitles it to notice of the filing), and it will know this only by process
of elimination. For instance, if the pioneer has listed two patents and receives notice
of a paragraph IV certification with respect to only one patent, then the generic
applicant has chosen not to challenge the other patent. There are only two
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biologics statute, only privately communicated promises not to launch.
47
Ultimately, under both schemes, in order to preclude follow-on market
entry, the pioneer must persuade the follow-on applicant, or establish in
court, that the patent is valid, infringed, and enforceable. By way of con-
trast, exclusivity need not be asserted against a follow-on applicant. As a
feature of the drug regulatory approval scheme, it automatically dictates
the pathways to market available at any particular time. Although exclu-
sivity is not entirely unassailable, an investor can generally plan around
exclusivity expiry more confidently than it can plan around patent expi-
148
ry.
Third, the regulatory standards applicable to follow-on applicants no
longer align with composition of matter patents. While the ANDA path-
way requires a generic drug to have the same active ingredient as its ref-
erence product, the agency's view-hinted in the 1990s and confirmed in
2006-that section 505(b) (2) permits follow-on applicants to propose
merely similar active ingredients means that FDA will now approve fol-
low-on companies that have designed around core-substance patents.
4
1
possibilities: the generic applicant has included a paragraph III certification
indicating it will wait until patent expiry, or (if the patent covers a method of using
the drug) the generic is carving out-not seeking approval for-the use in question.
147 See PHSA, 42 U.S.C. § 262(0 (3) (B) (ii) (II) (2012).
'4' That said, exclusivity is not impermeable. First, it can be challenged both
administratively and judicially. For instance, Sandoz successfully challenged
administratively the exclusivity award to Wyeth for Torisel (temsirolimus) on the
ground that temsirolimus was an ester of sirolimus, previously approved under the
name Rapamune. See Letter to Kurt Karst, Counsel for Sandoz, from Keith 0.
Webber, Deputy Director, Office of Pharmaceutical Science, CDER (May 29, 2012),
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsaffda..docs/nda/2007/0220880riglsOOOAdmin
corresPart%202.pdf. The award of exclusivity to Vyvanse (lisdexamfetamine
dimesylate) was challenged administratively and then appealed judicially. See Actavis
Elizabeth LLC v. FDA, 625 F.3d 760, 762 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Second, in close cases under
the FDCA, an innovator may be called upon to justify NCE status during the approval
process, and it may not learn the agency's ruling until months after approval. Third,
FDA has taken a hostile approach in the biologics setting, essentially requiring BLA
applicants to submit extensive briefing documents to justify exclusivity and failing to
inform BLA holders of their status until many months after approval. See, e.g., FDA,
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: REFERENCE PRODUCT ExcLusIvITY FOR BIOLOGICAL
PRODUCTS FILED UNDER SECTION 351(A) OF THE PHS ACT 7-8 (drft. Aug. 2014),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/
guidances/ucm407844.pdf. All of this noted, the uncertainty of exclusivity pales in
comparison to the inherent uncertainty of, and need to enforce, patent protection.
"49 21 C.F.R. § 314.54 (2015) (describing contents of a 505(b) (2) application);
505(b) (2) GUIDANCE, supra note 14, at 5 (permitting use of the provision for "a
change in an active ingredient"). See generally Letter from Steven K. Galson, supra note
62, at 32 (explaining the FDA's assertion of legal authority to approve the 505(b) (2)
application for Omnitrope in response to a citizen petition accompanying approval of
Omnitrope, which was "highly similar" to the petitioner's reference product
Genotropin).
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Further, nothing in the agency's writings suggests it would refuse a dis-
similar active ingredient, provided the 505(b) (2) applicant submitted
sufficient bridging data to justify whatever reliance on the first entrant's
research it desired. And yet, these companies file abbreviated applica-
tions; they rely on the pioneer's research. Data exclusivity-not patent
protection-stands between the pioneer and these follow-on competitors.
The biosimilar scheme continued this regulatory approach by scientific
necessity (because biosimilars are necessarily highly similar to, rather
than the same as, their reference products),'50 and may permit approval
of abbreviated applications for products that are sufficiently dissimilar to
avoid composition-of-matter patents.' 5' This will depend in part on how
FDA applies the statutory standard for biosimilar approval and bears
watching closely. In these cases, too, data exclusivity may be critical to
motivate prospective first entrants; patents may not do the job.
Recent legislative proposals would provide the choice of either data
exclusivity or patent protection-that is to say, they would allow innova-
tors to select a longer period of data exclusivity in exchange for relin-
quishing patent-infringement claims against the sponsors of follow-on
products.15 Although these proposals perpetuate the myth that data ex-
clusivity is an affirmative federal benefit comparable to a patent, they do
allow innovators to mitigate shortcomings in patent protection on a case-
by-case basis with an additional period of time before abbreviated appli-
153
cations may be submitted (or approved, as the case may be).
"0 See, e.g., Safe and Affordable Biotech Drugs: The Need for a Generic Pathway: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't. Reform, l10th Cong. 23 (2007) (statement of
Janet Woodcock, Deputy Comm'r, Chief Med. Officer, Food & Drug Admin.)
[hereinafter Woodcock] (noting a "general recognition that the idea of sameness, as
the term is used in the generic drug approval process... will not usually be
appropriate for... biological products").
' Bruce S. Manheim, Jr. et al., Follow-On Biologics: Ensuring Continuing Innovation
in the Biotechnology Industry, 25 HEALTH An. 394, 397 (2006) (explaining the potential
to work around patents given the similarity standard).
,2 Variations of this proposal have been introduced repeatedly over the last
several years, typically in freestanding bills and labeled as either the "Dormant
Therapies Act" or the "MODDERN Cures Act." As of this writing, inclusion of the
language was under consideration for a larger omnibus bill, the 21st Century Cures
Act, although it has not appeared in every discussion draft. See Kurt R. Karst, House
Energy & Commerce Committee Releases 21 [sic] Century Cures Act Discussion Draft; The
Nearly 400-Page Bill Includes More Proposals than You Can Shake a Stick at!, FDA L. BLOG
(Jan. 28, 2015), http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda law -blog-hyman-phelps/2015/01/
house-energy-commerce-committee-releases-21-century-cures-act-discussion-draft-the-
nearly-400-page-b.html.
... See also Yaniv Heled, Why Primary Patents Covering Biologics Should Be
Unenforceable Against Generic Applicants Under the Biologics Price Competition and
Innovation Act, 21 ANNALS HEALTH L. 211, 216-17 (2012) (arguing that allowing
concurrent patent protection and data exclusivity is a waste of resources); Yaniv
Heled, Patents vs. Statutory Exclusivities in Biological Pharmaceuticals-Do We Really Need
Both?, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 419, 423-24 (2012) (arguing that the
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B. On What Terms Society Derives a Net Benefit: Ensuring the Incentives Work
The preceding Subsection addressed whether society derives a net
benefit from a period of time during which all applicants face the same
barrier to entry, followed by introduction of a shortcut pathway that al-
lows applicants to reach the market on cheaper and faster terms, relying
on the pioneer's labor. This Subsection considers the remainder of the
question: on what terms society derives this net benefit. It works from and
assesses the key differences in approach toward exclusivity taken in non-
biological drug and biological drug schemes.
The differences are as follows. First, the schemes take fundamentally
different approaches to pioneer research supporting application approv-
al. The FDCA protects research the first time, and only the first time, it is
performed by someone to support approval of a particular active ingredi-
ent. The PHSA protects research every time a new company performs it
to support its own first application for the product. This Article refers to
the approach for non-biological drugs as the "active ingredient" ap-
proach although, as will be seen below, the FDA has narrowed it adminis-
tratively to something called the "active moiety." This Article refers to the
approach for biological drugs as the "product" or "product-by-product"
approach. Second, the schemes take different approaches to subsequent
research performed by pioneers with respect to their already approved
active ingredients, although neither provides any meaningful incentive
for this research. And third, the schemes take different approaches to in-
novation by follow-on applicants-in other words, to applications that are
partly abbreviated (relying on earlier research without consent) and part-
ly new. The FDCA permits this work; the PHSA does not. These founda-
tional structural differences between the schemes are explained and
weighed below.
1. Initial Research for Approval
By far the most significant difference between the non-biologic and
biologic drug schemes is the basic approach to research performed by
exclusivity afforded to biologics is superior to patent protection and should replace
primary patent protections once FDA has approved the pioneer). If the reframing of
exclusivity in this article is correct-and exclusivity is not an affirmative grant from
the state-mandatory substitution of exclusivity for patent protection would arguably
be tantamount to eliminating patent protection. This would raise issues beyond the
scope of this article. The federal legislative proposals discussed in Karst, supra note
152, have been voluntary.
It might be fruitful to also consider giving innovators the option to select waiver
of patent linkage-the rules that prohibit FDA approval of a follow-on application
until 30 months of litigation have completed or patent expiry, if the patent is valid
and infringed-in exchange for a longer period of data exclusivity. This too would
perpetuate the myth that data exclusivity is an affirmative federal benefit comparable
to a patent, but would similarly allow innovators to mitigate shortcomings in patent
protection on a case-by-case basis.
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pioneers, i.e., to the safety and effectiveness data submitted to support a
full NDA or BLA. The FDCA provides a single five-year waiting period for
the abbreviated pathway, which dates from the first approval of the active
ingredient, no matter who sponsored the application. The PHSA pro-
vides a 12-year period before abbreviated applications for each pioneer
company's first application-in other words, every time a full-blown ap-
plication for the biologic is submitted by a new pioneer. This difference,
which has not been explored in academic scholarship to date, leads to
inconsistent results.
a. Differing Approaches
Explaining the FDCA approach for non-biological drugs requires a
detour into the statutory and regulatory language. The statutory five-year
exclusivity provision delays abbreviated applications that propose to copy
a drug "no active ingredient (including any ester or salt of the active in-
gredient) of which" has previously been approved. 15 The agency limits
this exclusivity to what it labeled, in 1989, "new chemical entities" or
NCEs. The FDA's regulations in turn define that phrase to mean drug
products that do not contain any previously approved "active moiety,"
which the agency defines as the molecule responsible for the physiologi-
cal or pharmacological action of the drug. 55 In the FDA's view, the active
moiety is different from active ingredient, which simply means the sub-
stance prior to its introduction to the body.1
5
6
The FDA protects not only the initially approved product, but also
any subsequent product containing the same active moiety proposed by
the same company. In other words, if a company obtains approval of a
new chemical entity and has exclusivity expiring on December 31, 2020,
any subsequent application from that company for the same active moie-
ty (for instance, an application for a new route of administration, or an
application for a combination product) will also be protected from ge-
nerics until December 31, 2020. This is known as "umbrella" exclusivity.
The agency explained that if exclusivity applied only to the initial prod-
uct, "an innovator's exclusivity could lose its value as soon as FDA ap-
proved a second full new drug application for a version of the drug, be-
FDCA, 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(ii) & (j) (5) (F) (ii) (2012).
21 C.F.R. § 314.108(a) (2015).
' See Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 988 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (rejecting the
FDA's construction of "active ingredient including any salt or ester" to mean any
product that results in the same active moeity). The FDA based the "new chemical
entity" concept on its pre-existing classification scheme for applications; one type was
a "new molecular entity" application, and the agency concluded that Congress was
aware of this scheme and had generally meant to emulate it, thus avoiding
"significant periods of exclusivity" for "minor variations of previously approved
chemical compounds." Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 54 Fed. Reg.
28,872, 28,897-98 (proposed July 10, 1989) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 10, 310,
314, 320).
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cause an ANDA could be approved by reference to the second approved
version of the drug, which would not be covered by exclusivity." M' This
would be a "narrow" approach to exclusivity, and it would "seriously un-
dermine its value, reducing the incentives for research and innovation in
the pharmaceutical industry."'58 The "broader" approach selected instead
by FDA was to protect the active moiety itself, even if it appeared in "an-
other approved version of the innovator's drug."1
59
Congress structured biological-product exclusivity very differently.
The PHSA delays abbreviated applications that propose to copy specific
reference products. In other words, exclusivity attaches to finished prod-
ucts, which are inherently specific to individual pioneers, not to underly-
ing active ingredients. And the schemes are therefore inconsistent. An
example will demonstrate this. If two separate companies obtain approval
of innovative NDAs for a new drug, only the first to gain approval receives
five-year exclusivity. The second company is not entitled to five-year ex-
clusivity, because the active moiety has been previously approved. But if
two separate companies obtain approval of innovative BLAs for a new bi-
ologic, each is protected by its own 12-year term. The PHSA does not
permit FDA to deny exclusivity to the second company simply because
the first company has obtained approval of a similar or even highly simi-
lar molecule, active ingredient, or active moiety.
The active ingredient approach for non-biological drugs probably re-
flects the ANDA provision's historical roots in the "old drug" concept,
discussed in Section II. As noted, for 40 years old drug status-
specifically, the notion that once a particular ingredient had been the
subject of an application, generic drugs could be marketed without their
own applications-was the primary mechanism for generic drugs to
reach the market. The product approach in the PHSA had no particular
historical roots. And the legislative negotiations leading to enactment of
157 Id. at 28,897.
158 Id.
Id. Early writings from the FDA suggested that the agency would protect the
active moiety even if it appeared in another company's finished drug product-for
instance a product manufactured under a patent license or even a competitor's copy.
See id. Doing so would, after all, be consistent with the purpose of exclusivity and with
the rationale for the umbrella. If Company A obtained an NCE approval for an
unpatented drug in 2014, and Company B (which was developing the molecule at the
same time) was able to obtain approval in 2015 (because exclusivity blocks only
abbreviated applications, not full applications), failure to protect Product B under
the Product A term expiring in 2019 would effectively eliminate Product A's
exclusivity as well. Under FDA's initial proposal, where a first entrant received NCE
and a second received three-year new-product exclusivity for the same active moiety, a
third entrant could not file an ANDA citing the second application until the first
applicant's NCE exclusivity expired. The umbrella would protect the second entrant's
application.
'w It may receive three-year new product exclusivity, discussed infra subsection
III.B.2.
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the biosimilar statute did not focus on the decision to adopt a product-by-
product approach to exclusivity rather than the active ingredient ap-
proach in existing law. '6' But the use of a product approach for biologics
makes sense in light of the fact that two biological products generally
cannot be shown identical to each other.'62 In other words, if two innova-
tors independently synthesize and study the non-biological drug fluoxe-
tine (originally marketed as Prozac), it is easy for FDA to conclude that
the second has developed the same active ingredient (and moiety) as the
first. But if two innovators independently manufacture and develop the
biological drug trastuzumab (marketed as Herceptin), it is possible that
there will be clinically meaningful differences between the two that can-
not be ruled out with analytical testing. Indeed, that is the very premise
of the BPCIA: even where a second applicant deliberately tries to copy
trastuzumab as closely as it can, some research will need to be performed
to determine whether there might still be clinically meaningful differ-163
ences. FDA's inability today to conclude that two biological products
have the same active ingredient makes the active ingredient approach to
data exclusivity unworkable.
b. Assessing the Options
The primary problem with the active-ingredient approach in the
FDCA is the uncertainty it creates. It has forced FDA into highly detailed
and complex regulations, policies, and decisions that are admittedly in-
consistent, disputed in administrative petitions and before courts, and
reversed legislatively. Some of the problem can be traced to ambiguity in
the statutory language itself, which could perhaps be remedied with
more artful drafting. 6' FDA's implementing regulation adds specificity
and detail,'1 but even still does not cover every possibility. Counsel still
... See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
16 See Woodcock, supra note 150, at 23.
'63 See generally PHSA, 42 U.S.C. § 262(k) (2012); SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERATIONS
GUIDANCE, supra note 37.
"" See, e.g., Actavis Elizabeth LLC v. FDA, 625 F.3d 760, 765 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(finding ambiguity as to whether the phrase "active ingredient" requires the FDA to
look at the molecule that reaches the site of drug action or at the form of the
molecule that enters the body); Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 987-88 (D.C.
Cir. 1990) (noting ambiguity as to whether exclusivity is precluded only if the first
drug is a salt of the second, or precluded also if the second is a salt of the first).
'0 The final regulation looks for prior approval of the molecule-excluding
"appended portions of the molecule that cause the drug to be an ester, salt.., or
other noncovalent derivative (such as a complex, chelate, or clathrate) of the
molecule"-responsible for the action of the drug substance. 21 C.F.R. § 314.108(a)
(2015). FDA reasons that the addition of a chelate, clathrate, or other noncovalent
derivative "generally does not affect the active moiety of a drug product." Abbreviated
New Drug Application Regulations; Patent and Exclusivity Provisions, 59 Fed. Reg.
50338, 50358 (Oct. 3, 1994). In contrast, the regulation permits five-year exclusivity
for derivatives of previously approved active moieties when those derivatives contain
2016]
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struggle to provide definitive answers when new scientific possibilities
emerge. For example, just a few years ago, litigation erupted over a par-
ticular nuance not covered explicitly by the regulation-exclusivity for a
prodrug containing a covalent non-ester bond.16 Some decisions from
FDA have prompted congressional intervention, including a now-defunctS 167
approach to enantiomers and a still-evolving approach to fixed-dose
combinations.
The inquiry into absolute novelty of the active moiety has also prov-
en impossible with more complex and poorly understood molecules or
mixtures of molecules. The FDA generally deems a product to contain an
NCE when it is unable to determine the product's active moiety with
specificity-in essence, defaulting to the more manageable (PHSA-style)
approach of awarding exclusivity on a product-by-product basis. For in-
stance, each approved hyaluronidase product has received NCE exclusivi-
ty, as has each pancrelipase product, largely because FDA was unable to
discern the precise active moiety in it and in the prior products.' 69 That
non-ester covalent bonds. In FDA's view, drug derivatives with non-ester covalent
bonds are different and "deserving" of five-year exclusivity. Actavis Elizabeth, 625 F.3d
at 765. Indeed, "even minor covalent structural changes are capable of producing not
only major changes in the activity of a drug but changes that are not readily
predicted." Id. at 765-66 (quoting the FDA's response to a 1989 petition).
. A prodrug is biologically inactive and must be metabolized in the body to
produce the active drug. See Actavis Elizabeth, 625 F.3d at 763 (affirming agency's
decision to permit exclusivity for any prodrug that is not an ester, salt, or other type
of non-covalent derivative).
17 FDA historically refused to grant exclusivity to enantiomers of previously
approved racemates but not to single racemates of previously approved enantiomers.
Congress acted in 2007, though FDA had been reassessing the issue since the 1990s.
See Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, sec.
1113, 121 Stat. 823, 976-77; Dickinson, supra note 77, at 200.
1' FDA historically required both ingredients to constitute new chemical entities.
In response to a series of citizen petitions, FDA recently issued guidance stating that
.new chemical entity" includes fixed-dose combination drugs that contain previously
approved chemical entities, so long as one of the drug substances in combination
meets the definition of new chemical entity. See FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: NEW
CHEMICAL ENTITY EXCLUSIvrrY DETERMINATIONS FOR CERTAIN FIXED-
COMBINATION DRUG PRODUCTS 1, 6 (Oct. 2014), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
drugs/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/guidances/ucm386685.pdf. Pending
federal legislation would go further, stating that "new chemical entity" includes any
fixed-dose combination drug if the particular combination has not previously been
approved and the application is supported by clinical data other than bioavailability
data. Combination Drug Development Incentive Act of 2015, H.R. 406, 114th Cong.
§ 3 (2015).
'9 See Letter from Janet Woodcock, Dir., Ctr. for Drug Eval. & Research, to
Robert A. Dormer at 9-10 (Feb. 21, 2014) (on file with author). Hyaluronidase is
used to increase the absorption of other injected medicines. Pancrelipase is used to
improve digestion of food in patients who do not have enough pancreatic enzymes-
for instance, because of cystic fibrosis or a blockage between the pancreas and
intestine. Uncertainty also prompted the agency to permit NCE status for Condylox
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said, some of the agency's decisions when faced with uncertainty simply
cannot be explained, and the agency has not even tried to resolve what it
openly admits are "contradictions" in its decision-making.7 °
Moreover, more than 30 years after enactment of the scheme, and
more than 20 years after FDA finalized its exclusivity regulation, the basic
approach of the regulation remains vulnerable. In May 2015, in a case re-
lating to yet another nuance left unaddressed by FDA's regulation-
involving a complex undifferentiated fish oil mixture, one consistently
present molecule of which had been approved previously-a federal dis-
trict court found the agency's denial of exclusivity conflicted with the
statute's plain meaning, was not reasoned, and was in fact unreasona-
ble. " ' Among the problems cited by the court were FDA's basic approach
of construing "active ingredient" in the exclusivity provision (but not
elsewhere in the statute) as "active moiety" and the fact that the agency's
approach creates uncertainty for innovators.
7 2
As a practical matter, and in contrast with the active ingredient ap-
proach, the product approach need not force the regulator into distract-
ing and potentially unworkable efforts to pre-specify rules about-or oth-
erwise parse-molecular distinctions. That is, after all, why FDA has
essentially resorted to a product approach when faced with non-
biological drugs as to which it cannot parse molecular distinctions. Expe-
rience with medical-device approval is supportive; the scheme provides
six years of data protection for premarket-approval applications on a
(podofilox, or podophyllotoxin), approved in 1993 for treatment of warts. The
agency was unable to determine whether any of the 13 previously marketed
podophyllum-resin products included podophyllotoxin as an active ingredient. Id. at
10-11.
"0 See id. at 14-15. The FDA had awarded Infasurf five-year NCE exclusivity
"despite having determined that Infasurf has the same active moiety as a previously
approved drug, Survanta, under a definition of active moiety that is identical to that
in the NCE context." Id. at 15. The letter noted that "there does not appear to be a
record documenting the reasons for the decision" and that "there does not appear to
have been an attempt to meaningfully distinguish" the NCE decision from the
context in which the other decision was made. Id. A similar incident occurred with
Curosurf, also awarded NCE status, and the letter stated that the "records for these
determinations are sparse" and it is "not clear" whether the FDA has "attempted to
resolve or address" the "contradiction" in question. Id.
' See Amarin Pharms. Ir. Ltd. v. FDA, No. 14-cv-00324, 2015 WL 3407061, at *18
(D.D.C. May 28, 2015) ("Whether the problems with the FDA's decision are
characterized as failures under Chevron step one, step two, or the APA's requirement
of reasoned decision-making, the Agency's decision must be set aside."), appeal
docketed, No. 15-5214 (D.C. Cir. July 30, 2015).
'72 See id. ("The Agency makes no attempt to explain how its approach furthers
Congress's purposes or is otherwise a reasonable policy choice, especially in light of
the clear interest in providing notice to potential innovators of the exclusivity to
which they might eventually be entitled.").
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product-by-product basis, without any need to compare device types.1 73
There have not been any meaningful disputes over interpretation or ap-
plication of the provision.1
74
The product approach may also encourage research that amplifies
our understanding of already approved medicines, but in a nuanced way
that allows market pressures to eventually point away from research that
merely corroborates. By way of contrast, the active-ingredient approach is
hard to square with an approach to public policy that values additional
controlled testing of relatively new moieties. Specifically, the fact that ex-
clusivity under the PHSA attaches to the product may provide an incen-
tive for companies to be the second or third to develop and market an
innovative biological molecule-the second or third to market filgrastim
or trastuzumab, for instance. While the first innovator may face a biosimi-
lar 12 years after its market entry, the second innovator will not face a bi-
osimilar until 12 years after its own market entry. So long as biosimilars
are not deemed interchangeable and are marketed more like branded
competitors, and so long as the number of biosimilars for any particular
biological product remains as low as currently expected, the second in-
novator may face the prospect of being only one of a few (the first en-
trant, the second entrant, and any biosimilars of the first entrant) in the
marketplace.
Depending on the demand for and pricing of those particular prod-
ucts, this arrangement may still be sufficiently attractive to warrant sec-
ond-place innovation. And because two innovative versions of the same
biological molecule are unlikely to be clinically identical, patients may
benefit from the additional option in the marketplace. If this approach
were taken in the non-biological drug setting, and depending on the
length of the first entrant's data-exclusivity period, it might lead to sec-
ond-place innovation early in the data-exclusivity period, but is less likely
to do so later given the prospect of (later) multiple substitutable generic
copies of the first entrant. This would have the benefit of encouraging
confirmatory research early in the molecule's lifespan and allowing mar-
ket disincentives to dissuade this testing later.
'7' See FDCA, 21 U.S.C. § 360j(h) (4) (A) (2012) ("Any information contained in
an application for premarket approval ... shall be available, 6 years after the
application has been approved by the Secretary, for use by the Secretary in...
approving another device....").
"' The device provision has been used repeatedly and seemingly without
controversy. E.g., Reclassification of Stair-Climbing Wheelchairs, 79 Fed. Reg. 20,779
(Apr. 14, 2014) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 890); Reclassification of the
Intervertebral Body Fusion Device, 72 Fed. Reg. 32,170 (June 12, 2007) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 888); Reclassification of the Extracorporeal Shock Wave
Lithotripter, 65 Fed. Reg. 48,609 (Aug. 9, 2000) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 876).
The FDA received only one comment on the draft guidance implementing the
provision, which it has not bothered to upload for public access.
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2. Subsequent Research by Pioneers
The non-biological and biological drug schemes differ also in their
treatment of subsequent research by pioneers once new molecular enti-
ties have been approved. This "incremental innovation" includes the de-
velopment and testing of new conditions of use-indications, dosing reg-
imens, dosing instructions, dose levels, strengths, frequency of
administration, durations of use, routes of administration, dosage forms,
and so forth. It also includes variations to the underlying active ingredi-
ent that do not rise to the level of a new molecular entity.
Sometimes this new research is the subject of a "supplement" to an
approved application-a supplemental NDA or supplemental BLA-and
sometimes it is the subject of a separate application-a new NDA or new
BLA. FDA is the ultimate arbiter with respect to whether a supplement or
full application will be required in any particular case, but typically a new
indication appears in a supplement whereas a new route of administra-
tion or dosage form results in a separate application. 1 5 Examples of mo-
lecular variations-which always result in a new application-might in-
clude development of a different salt form of the active ingredient of a
non-biological drug, or pegylation (addition of polyethylene-glycol poly-
mer chains) in the case of a biological drug.
Ultimately, neither scheme provides a meaningful incentive for first
entrants to conduct follow-up research, though the problem is particular-
ly acute with respect to new indications and other new labeling infor-
mation.
a. Differing Approaches
Incremental innovations for non-biological drugs (approved under
the FDCA) are protected by three-year exclusivity. 76 As noted in Section
II, if a pioneer's drug is not a new chemical entity but the application
contains clinical data essential to its approval, then an abbreviated appli-
cation may not be approved until three years after the pioneer applica-
tion. The three-year period applies to both full NDAs and also supple-
ments. In other words, if a pioneer submits an NDA for a new route of
administration for its previously approved drug, or an NDA for a molecu-
lar change that does not result in a new chemical entity, the new NDA
will receive three years of exclusivity. And if the pioneer submits a sup-
"' Some of the policies the agency follows can be found in FDA, GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY: SUBMITTING SEPARATE MARKETING APPLICATIONS AND CLINICAL DATA FOR
PURPOSES OF ASSESSING USER FEES (Dec. 2004), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
drugs/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/guidances/ucm079320.pdf
176 In the case of a molecular variation, it is also possible the innovation would
result in a new chemical entity entitled to five years of data exclusivity. But in the case
of a new condition of use for an already approved active ingredient, the sponsor will
receive three-year exclusivity or nothing at all. Abbreviated New Drug Application
Regulations, 54 Fed. Reg. 28,872, 28,899 (proposed July 10, 1989) (to be codified at
21 C.F.R. pts. 10, 310, 314, 320).
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plement to its original NDA for a new indication, the supplement will re-
ceive three years of exclusivity.
As a practical matter, three-year exclusivity provides little incentive
for innovators to continue studying their approved non-biological drugs.
To begin with, three-year exclusivity is undermined by the FDA's narrow
interpretation of when it applies. The FDA takes the position that only a
"considerable" investment in clinical testing will result in protection
and will grant exclusivity only if there is documentation that the agency
agreed that the studies performed to support the new condition of use
were "essential" to its approval. ' The protection is also undermined by
the FDA's view that three-year exclusivity protects only the new condition
of use in question. This means that if the condition of use is information-
al (like a new indication or dosing regimen) rather than functional (like
a new dosage form or route of administration), three-year exclusivity
functions only as a labeling restriction. Exclusivity means the generic ap-
plicant cannot include that protected information in its labeling."9
Even when the FDA agrees that new information in the labeling of
an already approved new drug is protected by three-year exclusivity, that
information as a general rule is not worth very much. Although generic
drugs must generally bear the same labeling as their reference drugs, a
' According to the FDA, "Congress intended to reward with 3 years of
exclusivity only those investigations that require a considerable investment of time
and money." Id. (citing statements of both Senator Hatch, 130 Cong. Rec. 23,764
(1984), and Representative Waxman, 130 Cong. Rec. at 24,425). Concluding that
Congress intended to reward "only those who have made a substantial investment in
new clinical studies," FDA has also interpreted the provision to deny exclusivity in the
case of collection and submission of literature studies, as well as "buying the results of
tests already done and submitting them to FDA." Id. at 28,900.
78 The statutory language requires "clinical investigations (other than
bioavailability studies) essential to the approval of the application and conducted or
sponsored by the [applicant]." FDCA, 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(iii)-(iv),
(j) (5) (F) (iii)-(iv) (2012). The FDA defines "essential to approval" to mean that
"there are no other data available that could support approval of the application." 21
C.F.R. § 314.108(a) (2015). FDA's insistence on unambiguous documentation to that
effect can result in an exclusivity denial even where a company performs clinical
research believing in good faith that the research was needed. See Upjohn Co. v.
Kessler, 938 F. Supp. 439, 440-43 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (denying preliminary injunction
challenging the FDA's denial of exclusivity for a supplemental application for
nonprescription status of Rogaine and finding no likelihood of success on the merits,
despite the sponsor's inclusion of a clinical study that had been described in meetings
with FDA after agency officials specifically raised the need to address certain risks in
the application).
"' FDA currently construes three-year exclusivity to protect the condition of use
that was the subject of the clinical study, rather than the data from the study per se.
This can have significant consequences when follow-on applicants use the hybrid
pathway of section 505(b) (2). See supra Section II.A.1. But even when so construed,
the protection remains nothing more than a labeling restriction in the case of
informational conditions of use and is therefore limited as discussed in the text.
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variety of statutory and regulatory exceptions usually work together to
permit approval of a generic drug where the applicant has omitted in-
formation protected by three-year exclusivity or patent.'8° Moreover, as
noted in Section II.C, a generic drug is usually deemed therapeutically
equivalent ("A rated") by the FDA.18' This is true even if the generic drug• 82
labeling carves out protected information. Further, an A-rated generic
drug will generally be substituted for its reference product under state
law regardless of the intended use; prescriptions usually do not specify,
and pharmacists usually do not inquire about, the purpose of the pre-
scription, let alone check to see whether the generic labeling includes
the use in question. Even if the generic applicant omits new-use infor-
mation from its labeling because of three-year exclusivity, its generic drug
will likely be dispensed for that use. In this case, the exclusivity is worth
nothing.
," The same-labeling provision explicitly permits labeling differences due to
permitted deviations in a generic drug's route of administration, dosage form,
strength, or active ingredient (in a combination product), or due to the fact that the
generic and reference drug are produced or distributed by different manufacturers.
See FDCA, 21 U.S.C § 355(j)(2) (A) (v). The patent-certification provision implicitly
permits the generic company also to carve out indications because it refers to not
seeking approval for indications claimed by unexpired method of use patents. Id.
§ 355 0 ) (2) (A) (viii). The FDA's regulations prohibit a generic company from carving
out protected information if doing so renders the generic less safe and effective than
the pioneer product for the remaining non-protected conditions of use. 21 C.F.R.
§ 314.127(a)(7) (2015). The agency has liberally permitted omission of information
protected by intellectual property under this standard. See Kurt R. Karst, Decisions,
Decisions, Decisions! Our Updated Labeling Carve-Out Citizen Petition Scorecard, FDA L.
BLOG (May 16, 2012), http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda law blog-hyman-phelps/
2012/05/decisions-decisions-decisions-our-updated-abeing-carve-out-citizen-petition-
scorecard.html.
In addition, the agency will not attach three-year exclusivity to labeling changes if
"protection of the public health" requires that generic labeling to reflect the changes.
Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations; Patent and Exclusivity Provisions, 59
Fed. Reg. 50,338, 50,356 (Oct. 3, 1994) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 314). This
includes certain new risk information. Further, FDA will not accept arguments that
new safety information must be included as a matter of public health and yet may not
be included as a matter of exclusivity. See AstraZeneca Pharms. LP v. FDA, 872 F.
Supp. 2d 60, 85-86 (D.D.C. 2012). And the D.C. Circuit has rejected arguments that a
generic product may not be approved until all new-indication exclusivity has expired.
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Shalala, 91 F.3d 1493, 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
,8' This will not be the case where the generic applicant deviates with respect to
route of administration, dosage form, strength, or single active ingredient (in a
combination product).
"" See, e.g., Letter from Janet Woodcock, Dir., Ctr. for Drug Eval. & Research, to
Marcy Madonald et al. at 13 (June 11, 2002), http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/
dockets/dailys/03/Aug3/080103/03p-0321-c000003-03-Tab-02-voll.pdf ("FDA has
consistently maintained that the omission of information protected by exclusivity will
not be a basis for altering a therapeutic equivalence rating." (citing 59 Fed. Reg. at
50,357)); see also FDA, supra note 91, at 2.
2016]
LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW
To be sure, pioneers may derive a benefit from three-year exclusivity
tied to new product features (e.g., a new route of administration) and to
molecular variations (i.e., a new active ingredient that does not meet
FDA's standard for NCE exclusivity). The primary question for the pio-
neer, in these cases, is marketability, i.e., whether the new route of ad-
ministration or molecular variation will provide enough clinical benefit
to support premium pricing for a branded product once the generic of
the older versions is available. 183 This should press the pioneer toward
features of value in the clinic. Moreover, new indications and other in-
formational conditions of use with three-year exclusivity can be protected
from generic penetration as a practical matter if they happen to be
linked to a product feature that itself has exclusivity or patent protec-
tion.18 4 But even with the possibility of three-year protection for new
... The question whether the withdrawal of one product in connection with the
introduction of a newer and different product can, in some cases, raise antitrust
concerns is beyond the scope of this article. The Second Circuit recently ruled that
Actavis could not withdraw an immediate-release version of its drug from the market,
in favor of marketing only a newer (and patent-protected) extended release version,
until a full month after generics had entered the market with their immediate-release
products. New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 650-51 (2d
Cir. 2015). The court reasoned that withdrawal of the innovator's immediate-release
product prior to generic entry would effect a "hard switch"-forcing patients to use
the newer extended-release product-precluding them from evaluating the merits of,
and choosing between, a generic immediate-release product and the more expensive
branded extended-release product. See id. at 655 ("Had Defendants allowed Namenda
IR to remain available until generic entry, doctors and Alzheimer's patients could
have decided whether the benefits of switching to once-daily Namenda XR would
outweigh the benefits of adhering to twice-daily therapy using less-expensive generic
IR (or perhaps lower-priced Namenda IR)."). The court was influenced by the fact
that the generic IR products would not be substitutable for the pioneer's ER product,
which it felt would preclude their achieving meaningful market penetration. But the
court did not reject the basic point-relevant where a pioneer introduces new
product features when faced with generic competition for older versions of its
product-that the market can determine product superiority so long as the free
choice of consumers is preserved. See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603
F.2d 263, 287 (2d Cir. 1979). It remains to be seen whether any other court of
appeals will agree with the Second Circuit. The point here is just that exclusivity tied
to new product features may provide an incentive to develop those features, so long
as generic drugs with the older features simply compete on the basis of actual clinical
value.
.. Presumably if treatment of a new disease requires a new route of
administration, the generic drug (with the older features) would not be appropriate
for use. If a drug is approved in capsule form for one disease and as an injectable for
another disease, for instance, physicians are unlikely to prescribe the capsule for the
second condition. They may lawfully do so, but they are unlikely to do so. And
pharmacists will not dispense the capsule generic when they receive a prescription for
the branded injectable, because FDA will not list the two as therapeutically
equivalent.
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product features, the worthlessness of three-year exclusivity for new indi-
cations is a significant weakness.
Federal law provides even less incentive for innovators to continue
studying their approved biological drugs. To begin with, there is no ex-
clusivity for incremental improvements approved via supplements-
nothing analogous to three-year exclusivity in the FDCA. Thus, now that
abbreviated applications are approvable 12 years after first licensure of a
pioneer's biologic, it is unclear how often pioneers will study new indica-
tions. It may be worthwhile to study new indications early in the 12-year
term, if those indications are anticipated to substantially increase sales of
the product during the remaining term. But as the number of remaining
years of exclusivity drops, the value of studying new indications may drop,
and the declining incentive will be particularly acute for any indications
that require large, expensive, or long trials, as well as indications with rel-
atively small patient populations. Patent protection will not fill the gap.
Even if a biosimilar applicant omits the new indication from its labeling,
avoiding liability for patent infringement, its product may be prescribed
and used off-label, and pioneers are understandably unlikely to bring in-
fringement cases against the physicians and patients involved.15 All of
this suggests that pioneers may now, after enactment of the BPCIA in
2010, have less incentive to study new indications once their biological
drugs are approved. The rate and nature of incremental innovation-
especially with respect to new indications-by biological drug pioneers
would be worth watching closely in the years ahead.
The product approach to exclusivity in the PHSA could have-in
theory-incentivized any incremental innovation that would be the sub-
ject of an entirely new application rather than a supplement. Put simply:
under a pure product approach, every approved BLA would be associat-
ed with its own 12-year period without biosimilar competition. Thus, if a
new indication or route of administration resulted in a separate applica-
tion, a biosimilar applicant could use the shortcut pathway to copy the
first product (with its indication or route of administration), but it could
not use the shortcut pathway to copy the second product (with the new
indication or route of administration). This would be functionally the
same as three-year exclusivity under the FDCA (though much longer).
Again, healthcare professionals could lawfully prescribe the biosimilar of
the first pioneer product for the uses of the second pioneer product.
This means that the unavailability of the shortcut to biosimilar companies
would have been more or less valuable to the pioneer depending on
whether the incremental innovation was purely informational (less valu-
able) or tangible and tied to patent protection (more valuable). But the
18 As in the non-biological drug context, a new biological drug indication tied to
a new product feature (like route of administration) with patent protection would
receive indirect protection, for so long as biosimilar companies were unable to adopt
the patented new feature.
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product approach standing alone could have provided something func-
tionally approximating three-year exclusivity under the FDCA.
All of this is moot, though, because the "first licensure" provision of
the statute precludes this result. It explicitly prohibits a separate 12-year
period for a full application from the same company proposing a new in-
dication, route of administration, dosing schedule, dosage form, delivery
system, or strength. 86 Moreover, it precludes a 12-year exclusivity period
for a separate application from the same company proposing a structural-
ly different biological product unless a clinical difference results from the
structural changes. This creates substantial uncertainty for pioneers, be-
cause it may be impossible to predict the clinical significance of molecu-
lar modifications before investing the time and money in clinical trials
and because it may be difficult to prove causation (i.e., that the structural
change causes a clinical difference) given how poorly we understand the
mechanism of action of some biological products. And-again-the stat-
ute contains no equivalent to the three-year exclusivity term under the
FDCA, which is available for molecular variations that do not rise to the
level of an NCE. A biological sponsor-if its new molecule fails this struc-
tural change/clinical difference test-has nothing to fall back on.
The first licensure provision of the PHSA reflects mistrust of innova-
tors and the marketplace. During the legislative process, concerns were
raised that pioneers would make minor changes to their products, obtain
new approvals protected for 12 years, and frustrate effective biosimilar
market penetration-a process called "evergreening" by some. ' These
concerns could have been put to rest by the observation that under a
product approach to exclusivity, a 12-year protection period would attach
only to the new biological product, leaving the old biological product
free to copy. But some believed the innovative industry would use aggres-
sive marketing to shift consumers to the newer product, leaving biosimi-
lars of the older product to a smaller market. If the newer product were
clinically different or better, however, it is not clear this result would be
unwarranted; one might say this is precisely the work we want exclusivity
to do. After all, therapeutic alternatives and drug improvements benefit
society but require research. And a pioneer will perform the research only if
it expects a period of time during which no abbreviated applications will
be approved and ifduring that time it expects product sales.
Consumers must, therefore, be able to shift to the new product, if
they are persuaded of its benefit. Their shifting effectuates the data ex-
clusivity. Opponents of data exclusivity may have been concerned that
the new products would not be clinically different or better, but rational
purchasers should not shift patients to a newer more expensive molecule
that offers no meaningful clinical benefit, when less expensive copies of
'm See 42 U.S.C. § 262(k) (7) (C) (ii) (2012).
117 See Carver, Elikan & Lietzan, supra note 9, at 764,
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the initial molecule are available. 188 This may be particularly true in the
biologics marketplace where payers may have more, and individual pa-
tients perhaps less, control over therapy choice. Recent economic re-
search has confirmed that insurance firms and pharmacy benefit manag-
ers will correct when innovators introduce improvements that do not
provide adequate clinical benefit.
Protecting new products for 12 years, while permitting copies of old-
er products, would thus have used market-based incentives to focus sub-
sequent research by pioneers on meaningful therapeutic alternatives or
improvements. Concern about the gullibility of purchasers prevailed,
however, and various categories of subsequent research were called out
as per se insufficiently innovative to justify a new 12-year period. As a re-
sult, FDA will need to borrow umbrella exclusivity from the FDCA to give
some hope that companies will perform new research during the initial
12-year term, something that would not otherwise have been necessary.190
And there may be no incremental research as the 12 years wind down, let
alone after they expire. Thus, the first licensure provision may well shut
down whole categories of subsequent research by pioneers, to the detri-
ment of tomorrow's patients-a potentially significant dynamic-efficiency
loss.
The first licensure provision will also force the agency into a variety
of complex decisions that a pure product approach would not have re-
quired. These include difficult decisions about corporate relationships-
specifically, determining whether a subsequent pioneer is a "licensor,
predecessor in interest, or other related entity" of the initial pioneer for
purposes of denying exclusivity.' 9' The agency will also need to make de-
"" The fact that Sloan-Kettering declined in 2013 to provide newly approved
Zaltrap (aflibercept) to colorectal-cancer patients, despite a statistically significant
improvement in overall survival, preferring instead the older Avastin (bevacizumab)
at half the price, suggests a market skeptical of improvements with steep price tags.
See Sally Pipes, Opinion, For Cancer Treatments, a Rationing Trap, WASH. EXAMINER
(Jan. 9, 2013), http://washingtonexaminer.com/article/2518040.
.. See Henry Grabowski & Joseph DiMasi, Biosimilars, Data Exclusivity, and the
Incentives for Innovation: A Critique of Kotlikoffs White Paper 5 (Duke Univ. Dept. of
Econ. Working Paper No. 2009-02, 2009).
"* Umbrella exclusivity from the first approval would protect supplements and
new applications denied a separate term. Any other approach would effectively
eliminate the first product's exclusivity. The agency's reasoning in 1989 is squarely on
point. See supra text accompanying note 157. The FDA has given no indication that it
intends to take a different approach in the PHSA setting.
"' See 42 U.S.C. § 262(k) (7) (C) (ii) (2012). Like the five-year exclusivity provision
in the FDCA, this language is not free from ambiguity, particularly because one would
ordinarily expect the subsequent applicant to be the licensee rather than the licensor,
and the successor rather than the predecessor. The FDA's draft guidance document
implementing this language perpetuates the confusion. The agency begins by
following the plain language of the statute. FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY:
REFERENCE PRODUCT EXCLUSIVITY FOR BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS FILED UNDER SECTION
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cisions about qualifying and disqualifying modifications to the structure
of the biological product, and it will need to address the question of how
an applicant can establish that structural modifications "result" in clinical
differences. All of this will take place in regulation, guidance, policies,
and individual decisions that will be perforce inconsistent, challenged,
and politicized. It is hard to escape the conclusion that the first licensure
provision could be just as messy, in the end, as the NCE-exclusivity provi-
sion has been.
b. Assessing the Options
Society benefits from encouraging continuing research with ap-
proved drugs, whether the research appears in a supplement or a sepa-
rate application. The latter is easy to handle. A product-by-product ap-
proach to exclusivity can by its very structure reward the kinds of
innovation that appear in separate applications (such as new dosage
forms and new routes of administration, in most cases), and elimination
of the first licensure provision would help to ensure that it does. There is
one significant caveat: the risk of market share erosion through a com-
petitor's use of a partially abbreviated application for a "hybrid" product.
Here, the competing applicant relies on the data that are no longer pro-
tected by exclusivity and then supplements with its own research. Hybrids
applications, permitted by the FDA for non-biologics under the FDCA
but not authorized for biologics under the PHSA, are discussed in the
next Subsection. But with this caveat in place, product-by-product exclu-
sivity for new medicines seems a good solution to ensuring the kind of
research FDA requires in a full application.
A product-by-product approach to exclusivity, however, leaves un-
addressed the kind of innovation that FDA is likely to require in a supple-
ment rather than a new application, especially new indications. As noted,
the FDCA approach of protecting only the new condition of use is prob-
lematic for innovation policy, given labeling carve-outs and automatic
substitution; its adoption in the PHSA setting would be problematic de-
spite the lack of automatic substitution in that setting, because of off-
label prescribing. During the BPCIA negotiations, Congress considered a
variety of drafts that provided exclusivity for subsequent research by pio-
neers. Most of the bills, discussion drafts, and markup amendments that
addressed the issue followed the European approach rather than the
FDCA approach.' 9' The Europeans add an extra year of exclusivity to the
351(a) OF THE PHS ACT 4-5 (drfL Aug. 2014), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
drugs/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/guidances/ucm4078 4 4 .pdf. Later
in the same document, the agency reverses the plain language, instructing (second)
applicants to identify the previously licensed products for which a licensor or
predecessor in interest was the (first) license holder. Id. at 8.
. E.g., Patient Protection and Innovative Biologic Medicines Act of 2007, H.R.
1956, 110th Cong. § 2(a) (2) (2007) (extension of 14-year exclusivity period if FDA
approved a supplement for a new indication for the reference product during the
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base term if a significant new indication is approved before the end of
the first eight years. 193 They require proof of significant clinical benefit,
language that was echoed in many of the proposals under consideration
in the United States.'1" Because this approach defers all copies of the pi-
oneer product-rather than just preventing follow-on applicants from us-
ing protected language in their labeling-it mitigates the impact of off-
label prescribing and dispensing. It can, therefore, provide a meaningful
incentive to innovators. Why these proposals failed in the United States is
hard to explain, although the evergreening issue overwhelmed most dis-
cussions relating to exclusivity, and a sense that the base exclusivity term
was already long enough may have been a factor.' 95 In a redesigned
scheme that achieves dynamic efficiency, though, U.S. policymakers
might want to not only include the European approach but extend it to
all conditions of use that appear in supplements rather than separate ap-
plications, or at the very least all informational conditions of use, and ei-
ther retain the "significant clinical benefit" requirement or use the FDCA
concept of requiring clinical data essential to the new condition's ap-
proval.
A modest extension of the base exclusivity term as a reward for inno-
vations in supplements would seem to strike the right balance-better
first 12 years after licensure and if the new indication provided a significant clinical
benefit); Affordable Biologics for Consumers Act, S. 1505, 110th Cong. § 2(a) (2)
(2007) (same); Pathway for Biosimilars Act, H.R. 5629, 110th Cong. § 101(a)(2)
(2008) (providing that if, within the first eight years after licensure of the reference
product, the FDA approved a supplement for a new indication constituting "a
significant improvement, compared to marketed products, in the treatment,
diagnosis, or prevention of disease," the data-exclusivity period would be extended by
two years). The last of these-H.R. 5629--evolved into the final House-enacted
language, albeit without the exclusivity extension. Discussion drafts of S. 1695, which
would evolve into the final Senate-enacted language, also included an exclusivity
extension period for new research. See Carver, Elikan & Lietzan, supra note 9, at 753-
54 (noting that a discussion draft provided an extension of the applicable base period
if within a certain period of time the reference product was approved for a new
condition of use based on new clinical investigations essential to its approval and
showing a "significant clinical benefit" in comparison with existing therapies); see also
id. at 792-95 (discussing five proposed amendments, each taking a different
approach to exclusivity, that were filed in the Senate HELP Committee's markup of
the bill).
,' See Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6
November 2001 on the Community Code Relating to Medicinal Products for Human
Use, art. 10, 2001 O.J. (L 311) 67, as amended by Directive 2002/98/EC, 2003 (L 33)
30, by Directive 2004/24/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 136) 85, and by Directive 2004/27/EC,
2004 O.J. (L 136) 34. Separately, one year of data exclusivity is available to protect a
new use supported by "significant pre-clinical or clinical studies" even where the base
exclusivity has expired. Id. art. 10.5; see also Regulation (EC) 726/2004, art. 14, 2004
O.J. (L 136) 1 (governing data exclusivity).
See supra note 192.
,9 See Carver, Elikan & Lietzan, supra note 9, at 791-92.
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than either the PHSA approach (no incentive) or the FDCA approach
(sometimes meaningless incentive).' 96 Only one or a few extensions
should be permitted, though, as it is hard to escape the view that if all fol-
low-up innovation were to extend the initial exclusivity on the entire
product, rational innovators would stack follow-up innovations in virtual
perpetuity. That said, the clear disadvantage to the extension approach is
that it provides no reward for new research after the base exclusivity term
(as extended) expires. It might be fruitful to study the research life cycle
of drugs and biological products in the current armamentarium to de-
termine when, on average, most of the important new uses were discov-
ered or developed, although the usefulness of this information may be
diminished by the fact that the timing in some cases could have been a
function of strategic choice as much as scientific necessity. In any case,
policymakers may need to set the length of the initial exclusivity and ex-
tension long enough to capture the ordinary innovation life cycle for
most new moieties and resign themselves to the fact that (absent more
creative incentives) for-profit research is unlikely to take the molecule
further after the exclusivity expires.
3. Innovation by Follow-On Applicants
Traditional regulatory provisions-non-exclusivity provisions in ei-
ther statute-can play a significant role encouraging or discouraging re-
search and development by industry. In other words, some provisions
that are viewed as more traditional health-and-safety measures also im-
plement, whether intentionally or incidentally, innovation policy. One
deserves attention here because it can directly undermine the incentive
to perform additional research that would otherwise follow from data ex-
clusivity.
a. Differing Approaches
The provision in question is section 505 (b) (2) of the FDCA.'" A little
history may be helpful here. As noted earlier, prior to 1984, despite an
ANDA regulation for generic copies of pre-1962 pioneer products, there
"6 See Heled, supra note 58, at 220 (making a similar proposal). Another solution
would be to adopt both approaches, as Senator Gregg initially proposed in 2007. His
bill would have extended base exclusivity two years for a new indication providing a
significant clinical benefit, and it would have separately provided three-year
exclusivity covering a new indication any time after approval for a new indication not
meeting the significant clinical benefit standard, if supported by clinical data essential
to its approval. See Affordable Biologics for Consumers Act, S. 1505, 110th Cong.
§ 2(a)(2) (2007).
197 Professor Eisenberg has made this point before, largely focusing on clinical-
trial requirements, drug-importation rules, and rules relating to manufacturer speech
about unapproved uses. See Eisenberg, supra note 55, at 485; see also Eisenberg, supra
note 56, at 373 (exploring FDA regulation of clinical trials from the perspective of
innovation policy); Eisenberg, supra note 127, at 122-23.
198 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (2).
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was no pathway for generic copies of pioneer products approved after
1962. 1 The FDA attempted to fill the gap with a "paper NDA" policy.
This policy theoretically permitted generic applicants to submit pub-
lished literature as proof of the safety and effectiveness of their generic
copies. But it was not workable in practice.
Congress then stepped in with the Hatch-Waxman Amendments,
adding section 5050) and the more curiously worded section
505(b) (2) 2o Section 505(j) largely codified the agency's ANDA regula-
tion, but made it applicable to all pioneer drugs, no matter when ap-
proved. The innovative industry then argued for years that section
505(b) (2) codified the agency's paper NDA policy. In other words, the
argument went, section 505 (b) (2) authorizes a follow-on applicant to rely
on published literature describing studies that establish the safety and ef-
fectiveness of the drug in question where it lacks permission to reference
the underlying raw data-but, the argument continued, the provision
does not authorize reliance on the contents of a previously approved
NDA. Thus, one may cite journal articles describing studies of one's ref-
erence product but one may not make up the "difference" (whatever is
missing for "full" approval) by referring to the approved reference prod-
uct application. °4
The FDA rejected the "paper NDA" reading.2 As noted in Section
1I, the agency instead permits abbreviated applications under section
505(b) (2) that rely on the contents of a previously approved application.
Accordingly, 505(b) (2) applications can be characterized as "hybrid" ap-
plications-something of a cross between an ANDA and an NDA. They
may rely on a first entrant's research (like an ANDA does), but vary the
product in some fashion and support the change with new research (like
a pioneer NDA does).203 Consequently, a follow-on applicant might use
this provision if it wanted to propose a condition of use that had not
been sought by the pioneer. It might also use the provision if it wanted to
vary the molecule in some fashion, for instance changing the salt. In
"' See supra Subsection II.A.3.
Section 505(b) (2) refers to applications submitted under section 505(b) ()-
i.e., full new-drug applications-that nevertheless rely on investigations not
performed by the applicant and to which the applicant does not have a right of
reference. But it does not independently authorize the submission of applications, in
the way that 505(b) (1) and 505(j) do. (Both begin with "[a]ny person may file ....")
Without further explanation, section 505(b) (2) indicates that these applications are
subject to the Hatch-Waxman litigation provisions (including patent certifications
and 30-month stays).
2' For instance, Genentech made this argument in a citizen petition that FDA
denied in 2006 when it approved the first 505(b)(2) application for a follow-on
biotechnology product. See genera//y Letter from Steven K Galson, supra note 62, at 4-
7, 36-52.
Id. at 40.
2" See 21 C.F.R. § 314.54 (2015).
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short, then, under the FDCA a generic drug company may propose a per-
fect copy under section 505(j), or it may use the pioneer's research and
propose something different under section 505 (b) (2).
Congress considered, but did not enact, similar language for biolog-
ics.2° The statute does not authorize biosimilar applicants to rely on a pi-
oneer's data and yet seek approval of something different. This precludes
follow-on applicants from seeking approval of what some call "bio-
betters"-new versions of the molecule, additional labeling for new indi-
cations, and improved routes of administration. °5 Indeed, a biosimilar
applicant may not rely on the pioneer's data and simply propose changes
to avoid patent protection, such as alternative routes of administration or
dosage forms. If a biosimilar applicant wants to rely on the pioneer's da-
ta, it must propose a biosimilar biological product. The result, as noted
earlier, is a stark choice with complex trade-offs: seek approval of a bio-
similar (meeting the similarity standard) or file a full application. There
is no statutory option to seek partially abbreviated approval of a modified
product.
20 6
b. Assessing the Options
Depending on how it is drafted and interpreted, a hybrid pathway
like section 505(b) (2) can undermine the incentive effect of data exclu-
sivity as follows: Suppose a pioneer developed a second-generation ver-
sion of its product-perhaps a pegylated version of its biological prod-
uct2 -and obtained approval of a separate application. In a scheme with
product-by-product exclusivity, the new application would have its own
exclusivity term, preventing abbreviated applications for pegylated prod-
' See Access to Life-Saving Medicine Act, H.R. 6257, 109th Cong. (2006).
20' Of course, the pioneer may seek approval of a bio-better, whether through a
supplement or a new application. This incremental innovation is the subject of the
previous Section, II.
2 See supra Section II.C for a discussion of the trade-offs. There is a theoretical
possibility that the FDA will permit innovative supplements-under section 351 (a) of
the PHSA-to biosimilar applications filed and approved under section 351 (k) of the
PHSA. When initially interpreting section 505(b) (2) of the FDCA in the late 1980s,
the agency stated that it was possible for an ANDA applicant (under 505(j) of the
statute and forbidden to vary its product) to file a subsequent supplement under
section 505(b) (the pioneer provision) for variations it sought to market. See Letter
from Paul Parkman, Dir., Ctr. For Biologics Evaluation & Research (Apr. 10, 1987). It
is unclear whether the FDA had (or since, has) ever approved such a supplement-
the point of the letter was to interpret section 505(b) (2) as a substitute mechanism so
that generic applicants could seek the variation immediately without following the
described two-step ANDA-then-supplement process.
20' Pegylation-the attaching of polyethylene glycol polymer chains to a
molecule-can enhance solubility, prolong circulatory time, and reduce
immunogenicity/antigenicity. See generally Xingwang Zhang et al., Effects of
Pharmaceutical PEGylation on Drug Metabolism and Its Clinical Concerns, 10 EXPERT OP.
ON DRUG METABOLISM & TOXICOLOGY 1691 (2014).
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ucts. But if the scheme also permitted hybrid applications citing one
product without regard to exclusivity held by other products, a follow-on
applicant might obtain approval of its own pegylated product during that
exclusivity term, simply by citing the first product when its exclusivity ex-
pired and submitting original research to support pegylation. In other
words, it could obtain approval of a pegylated product more quickly and
more cheaply than an innovator-it could use a shortcut to market-
during the period when the pegylated product was theoretically the sub-
ject of data exclusivity. The availability of a hybrid application pathway to
circumvent data exclusivity in this fashion would presumably deter pio-
neers from subsequent research that would result in new applications.
By way of contrast, if the scheme did not permit hybrid applications,
or if it took into account exclusivity held by separate products, this would
not happen. 2°1 Under a product-by-product approach, companies seeking
to market copies of the second-generation product would file full appli-
cations on the same regulatory terms for 12 years, though they could
market copies of the first-generation product in the meantime. Using the
example in the preceding paragraph, until piggybacking applications
were permitted for the pegylated version, the only pegylated version on
the market would be the pioneer's product (or a true competitor prod-
uct: another pioneer version supported by a full application). This would
ensure a robust incentive for the pioneer to develop the pegylated ver-
sion. At the same time, there would be biosimilar copies of the non-
pegylated version in the marketplace, once its earlier exclusivity period
expired. If the pegylated version was not meaningfully different from the
earlier non-pegylated version, presumably most of the market would shift
to the copies of the first-generation product, creating a market-based in-
centive for first entrants to focus on clinically meaningful improvements
to their products.
There is of course a significant public health argument in favor of
the hybrid pathway. If an innovator has no plans to develop its molecule
further, society benefits from a regulatory scheme that permits others to
do so while enjoying use of the first entrant's research. The question is
whether it is possible to permit this use while preventing uses that will de-
ter the innovator from proceeding where it does want to-i.e., preventing
FDA currently takes the position that three-year exclusivity under the FDCA
blocks approval of a 505(b)(2) application regardless of whether the application
relies on the specific product that holds the exclusivity, at least where the applicant
seeks the conditions of approval tied to the exclusivity. The agency thus declined to
approve a 505(b) (2) application filed by Veloxis for Envarsus XR (tacrolimus), on the
ground that the application sought approval for a dosage form protected by three-
year exclusivity. The product with three-year exclusivity is Astagraf XL, however,
which was not the reference product cited by Veloxis. Veloxis had cited Prograf.
Veloxis challenged FDA's decision, and while this article was being drafted, a federal
district court ruled in FDA's favor. Veloxis Pharms. Inc. v. FDA, No. 14-2126 (RBW),
2015 WL 3750672, at *7-8 (D.D.C.June 12, 2015).
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use of the hybrid pathway to obtain approval of a first-generation hybrid
that exactly duplicates (or nearly duplicates) a protected second-
generation product. Drafting this in a way that maximized dynamic effi-
ciency would be complex and require thoughtful attention to questions
such as the right outcome where both applicants start studying the same
innovation at the same time (each unaware of the other), and the right
outcome where the pioneer obtains approval of the innovation in ques-
tion shortly before the unsuspecting hybrid applicant submits its applica-
tion. It is also very easy to imagine disputes-either during statutory
drafting or during implementation-over whether a particular hybrid
product is similar enough to the second-generation product that it
should fall within the prohibition. A clean approach to the issue for a
product-based scheme, with some precedent in U.S. law, might be to pre-
clude hybrid applications citing a product without exclusivity, if the pio-
neer holds approval of another product with exclusivity that could be its
reference product.2°9 But even this would generate interpretive challeng-
es. In brief, an approach that attempted to reserve an area for follow-on
applicants to innovate where pioneers have abandoned research could
reinstate the problems of moiety exclusivity and first licensure exceptions
that a pure product approach otherwise avoids.
If one were inclined to err on the side of maintaining incentives for
first entrants, perhaps on the theory that on average their incremental
innovation is more likely to be successful and clinically valuable than that
of follow-on applicants who lack familiarity with the molecule-a theory
that may benefit from empirical support-one would omit the hybrid
pathway altogether. Current law does, after all, permit the would-be hy-
brid applicant to purchase a right of reference to the original data and
continue research using its own resources. The resulting products would
presumably be less expensive than if the applicant had performed the
Congress took a similar approach in a different context in the uncodified
provisions of the BPICA. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No.
111-148, § 7002(e) (2), 124 Stat. 119, 804 (2010) (authorizing applications for certain
protein products under either the FDCA or the PHSA until 2020 but indicating that
an application "may not be submitted" under the FDCA if there is a product under
the PHSA that "could be a reference product"). Another possible precedent appears
in recent regulations proposed by the FDA to implement the 2003 amendments to
the Hatch-Waxman Amendments. Here, the agency has suggested that applications
under section 505(b) (2) should select the most appropriate reference product. See,
e.g., Abbreviated New Drug Applications and 505(b) (2) Applications, 80 Fed. Reg.
6802, 6804-05 (proposed Feb. 6, 2015) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 314, 320)
("We are proposing to require a 505(b) (2) applicant to identify a pharmaceutically
equivalent product, if already approved, as a listed drug relied upon, and comply with
applicable regulatory requirements. This is intended to help ensure that the
505(b)(2) pathway is not used to circumvent the statutory patent certification
obligations that would have applied if the proposed product was not ineligible for
approval in an ANDA.").
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original research itself, particularly if the innovator has no further inter-
est in pursuing the molecule (and consequently devalues the right of ref-
erence during negotiations for a license), and this may be all that poli-
210cymakers can hope for in a scheme that adequately fosters innovation.
4. Length of the Term
With these basic structural questions addressed, it is possible to turn
finally to the question of the length of the base exclusivity term. Current
law provides a variety of data exclusivity terms for research-based licens-
ing applications: 10 years for pesticides, 6 years for medical devices, 5
years for new drugs and new animal drugs, and 12 years for biological
products. As a general rule, these term lengths were not supported dur-
ing the legislative process by robust empirical work relating to innova-
211tion. In the late 1970s, as part of a reform effort unrelated to the later
,0 One interesting compromise is suggested-indirectly-in a 1997 article
authored by Professors Reichman and Samuelson. Reichman & Samuelson, supra
note 126, at 145-51. One might allow second entrants to propose "value-adding"
follow-on products-here, innovative copies-so long as "adequate compensation" is
paid under an automatic licensing scheme that would eventually sunset, much like
the data compensation provisions of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). In essence, one would require the innovator to sell the right
of reference.
21' The 10-year scheme for pesticides dates to the 1978 amendments to FIFRA.
Although legislators considered terms ranging from 5 years to 15 years and spoke in
general terms about innovation concerns, there does not appear to be any empirical
support for the term chosen. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 95-334, at 6 (1977) (noting
discussion of 12 to 15 years); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act: Hearings
Before the H. Comm. on Agric., 95th Cong. 227 (1977) (statement of Jack D. Early,
President, Nat'l Agric. Chems. Ass'n) (same); S. 1678, 95th Cong. (1977) (enacted)
(proposing seven years); H.R. 8954, 95th Cong. (1977) (proposing 10 years).
The legislative history of the medical-device-exclusivity provision does not explain
the selection of six years. See FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOR FDA REVIEWERS:
GUIDANCE ON SECTION 216 OF THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION MODERNIZATION
ACT OF 1997, at 5 (Aug. 9, 2000), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/
DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/ucm073709.pdf (pointing out
the lack of legislative history); see also S. Rep. No. 105-43, at 80-81 (1997).
The five-year and three-year terms for new drugs and new animal drugs also had
no meaningful empirical support at the time. See GeraldJ. Mossinghoff, Overview of the
Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
187, 191-92 (1999) (characterizing the terms as "arbitrary"). Mossinghoff was the
President of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association during legislative
negotiations for Hatch-Waxman. See also Stuart M. Pape, Market Exclusivity Under the
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984-The Five Clauses, 40
FOOD, DRUG, COSMETIC L.J. 310, 311 (1985) ("The absence of meaningful legislative
history is not surprising, given that four of the five clauses were added to the
legislation at the 'eleventh hour' after extended negotiations in August and
September 1984 among the brand-name pharmaceutical companies, the generics and
the principal Congressional sponsors of the legislation ... ."). The five- and three-
year terms for animal drugs enacted four years later were simply modeled on the
Hatch-Waxman provisions. S. Rep. No. 99-448, at 2 (1986) (noting that the Generic
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Hatch-Waxman Amendments, Congress considered a seven-year term for
new drugs, but the legislative history does not explain the choice of sev-
212
en.
The exception is the 12-year term for biological products. There is a
fair amount of legislative history for the biologics-exclusivity provision,
including robust empirical support for the term and extended debate
among participating economists. Terms of varying length were offered
during the legislative process, ranging from the zero-years gauntlet
thrown down by Representative Waxman in the fall of 2006 to the 14
years proposed by Senator Gregg and Representative Inslee in early
2007.2 3 The key Senators selected 12 years on June 22, 2007.214 This 12-
year period finds two explanations in the legislative history. First, in the
spring of 2007, Duke Economics Professor Henry Grabowski released a
working paper concluding that biotechnology companies typically recov-
er their investments in innovative products between 12.9 and 16.2 years
215
after product approval. He suggested that policymakers align data ex-
clusivity "with the time necessary for the representative new biologic enti-
ty to earn a positive risk adjusted return" on its large up-front investment
in research and development. 2' 6 Second, beginning in 2007, some argued
Animal Drug and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1988 was "modeled after" the
Hatch-Waxman Amendments and that its "purpose [was] to extend to veterinary
drugs and biologicals the generic competition and restored patent life afforded
human pharmaceuticals.... ."). See also Heled, supra note 54, at 330, 336, 348
(discussing the history of the ten-year pesticide exclusivity term, seven-year orphan
drug exclusivity term, and six-year medical-device-data exclusivity term).
212 Senator Kennedy's Drug Regulation Reform Act of 1979 would have abolished
the distinction between new drugs and old drugs and would have required all
prescription drugs to reach the market via approved applications. See Drug
Regulation Reform Act of 1979, S. 1075, 96th Cong. (1979). Seven years after
approval of a new drug application, abbreviated new drug applications would have
been permitted. See also S. Rep. No. 96-321, at 42 (1979) (describing rationale for
proposal but not explaining the selection of seven years).
213 See Access to Life-Saving Medicine Act, H.R. 6257, 109th Cong. (2006)
(Waxman); Patient Protection and Innovative Biologic Medicines Act of 2007, H.R.
1956, 110th Cong. (Inslee); Affordable Biologics for Consumers Act, S. 1505, 110th
Cong. (2007) (Gregg). The zero-year term was probably intended to signal that the
burden had been placed on the innovative industry to justify data exclusivity,
consistent with the prevailing narrative that data exclusivity is an affirmative
enactment for the benefit of first entrants. See SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERATIONS
GUIDANCE, supra note 37, at 7.
214 See Carver, Elikan & Lietzan, supra note 9, at 746.
215 See Grabowski, supra note 69, at 26. This analysis worked from pre-approval
research and development costs for biotechnology companies of $1.24 billion to
$1.33 billion in 2005 dollars, which had been published by Professor Grabowski and
Professor DiMasi (of Tufts University) earlier in the year. See id. at 22 (citing Joseph
A. DiMasi & Henry G. Grabowski, The Cost of Biopharmaceutical R&D: Is Biotech
Different?, 28 MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECON. 469 (2007)).
2"6 Id. at 30.
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that exclusivity for biological drugs should be roughly comparable to pa-
tent protection for non-biological drugs-either 14 years (because pa-
tent-term restoration is capped at 14 years) 2 7 or at least 12 years (on the
theory that this might be a rough estimate of effective patent life in prac-
tice).2 1 8 This argument was grounded in concerns that biological patents
might not provide adequate incentive for pioneers, discussed in Section
II above.
The discussion continued after the decision was made in June 2007.
Professor Grabowski published his conclusion in June 2008 in Nature Re-
views.2") The FTC convened a roundtable in November 2008, at which the•220
economic support for the data-exclusivity term was discussed. Alex
Brill-an economist with Matrix Global Advisors--did not contest the
basic economic framework put forward by Professor Grabowski, specifi-
cally the latter's focus on the break-even point. 22 But he reached a differ-
ent conclusion. Mainly, there is a dispute over the research-and-
development costs for new drugs and biologics, which necessarily feeds
into disagreement over the location of the break-even point. The two dis-
agree over the cost of capital and over expected margins; others, includ-
ing Professor Vernon at University of North Carolina, agree with Profes-
222
sor Grabowski. In his remarks, Brill focused also on the fact that biolog-
217 See Carver, Elikan & Lietzan, supra note 9, at 726-27 (describing the argument
by the Biotechnology Industry Organization for 14-year period); see also Stephen A.
Stack, Jr., Afterword: Some Further Observations on the "Pharmaceutical Wars," 71
ANTITRUST L.J. 705, 708 (2003) (suggesting 14 years because of the patent-term
restoration cap).
218 See Carver, Elikan & Lietzan, supra note 9, at 796-98 (describing arguments
for a 12-year period by Representative Eshoo, by Jeffrey Kushan on behalf of the
Biotechnology Industry Organization, and by Jack Lasersohn on behalf of the
National Venture Capital Association).
"' Henry Grabowski, Follow-on Biologics: Data Exclusivity and the Balance between
Innovation and Competition, 7 NATURE REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 479 (2008).
m0 See FTC, Transcript, FTC Roundtable on Follow-on Biologic Drugs:




2' Id. at 107 ("[T]he framework that Professor Grabowski has laid out is a
framework that he refers to and that I refer to in my work as break-even analysis,
which is asking the key question, which is the investment question, I think-I agree
this is about investment--of recouping the costs, recouping the R&D costs...
recouping the cost of capital as well and a whole associated number of costs that go
into the risky development of... bringing to market new drugs."); see also ALEX M.
BRILL, PROPER DURATION OF DATA EXCLUSIVITY FOR GENERIC BIOLOGICS: A CRITIQUE
4 (Nov. 2008), http://www.matrixglobaladvisors.com/storage/mga-studies/Brill
Exclusivity-inBiogenerics.pdf.
"' See Henry Grabowski et al., Data Exclusivity Periods for Biologics: Updating Prior
Analyses and Responding to Critiques (Duke Univ. Dept. of Econ. Working Paper No.
2008-10, 2008); see also FTC Transcript, supra note 220, at 118 (statement of Henry
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biological drug pioneers are expected to retain some market share after
biosimilar market entry, meaning that they will continue to recover re-
search and development costs after data exclusivity expires. He ultimately
concluded that the break-even date would not change substantially if data
exclusivity were seven years instead of 12 years. 22' But Professor Grabowski
had similarly pointed out that innovators might retain market share. In
the end, the participating economists agreed on the framework but used
different input values (e.g., cost of capital) and therefore reached differ-
ent conclusions. Professor Grabowski and colleagues published an up-
dated analysis and response to Brill at the end of the year, concluding
that limiting data exclusivity to fewer than 12-16 years would result in
failure of a representative portfolio of biologics to break even within an
extended period (after biosimilar entry) .224
A separate debate, unrelated to the calculation of break-even points,
erupted with Laurence Kotlikoff, a professor of economics at Boston
University. Professor Kotlikoff criticized the 12-year term under discus-
sion for the BPCIA-which he called "monopoly protection"-on the
ground that competition stimulates innovation and that data exclusivity
Grabowski) (pointing out that Brill focused on a handful of large successful
companies); John A. Vernon &Joseph H. Golec, A Response to the Brill Analysis for
Proper Data Exclusivity Periods for Innovator Biologics (Mar. 31, 2009),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1371020 (pointing out that Brill had ignored the most
current research findings on the cost of capital for biotechnology research and
development).
2 See FTC Transcript, supra note 220, at 116. In the legal literature, Professors
Adelman and Holman made a similar point in 2010 that the difference between
seven and 12 years of exclusivity for biological drugs would not materially affect
aggregate prescription-drug expenditures. Adelman & Holman, supra note 131, at
589. They reached this conclusion by pointing out projections that each innovative
biologic could have as few as three biosimilar competitors, leading to average price
drops of only 20%. This, in turn, would have a "minor" effect on prescription drug
expenditures, they argued, given that biotechnology products generate only 14% of
all revenue for pharmaceuticals. Id. at 584.
24 Grabowski et al., supra note 222, at 2; see also Henry Grabowski et al., Data
Exclusivity for Biologics, 10 NATURE REv. DRUG DiscovFRw 15, 15 (2011) (finding
that-after revising their model in light of the FTC discussion and allowing the
innovator to retain substantial market share after biosimilar entry-even if innovators
were able to retain ha/f the market with modest price decrease at biosimilar entry, the
break-even point would not occur until at least 12 years for the average drug entity).
At the end of 2010, Professor Vernon and others published a short paper working
from Professor Grabowski's model but concluding that his upper estimate of 16.2
years was "slightly low." They cited a series of papers showing that pharmaceutical
firm research and development spending is highly sensitive to financial returns and
risk. They suggest that prior research underestimated the risk affecting the cost of
capital and, adjusting the model, conclude that the appropriate length of data
exclusivity for biologics should be closer to 17 years. John A. Vernon et al., Exploration
of Potential Economics of Follow-On Biologics and Implications for Data Exclusivity Periods for
Biologics, 16 B.U.J. Sci. &TECH. L. 55, 71 (2010).
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225
can lead to less, rather than more, innovation over time. Working
largely from work on the "socially optimal length" for patents, he argued
that data-exclusivity terms "constitute uncontestable grants of monopoly
rights by government fiat" that would "substantially extend the duration
of monopoly protection" and "thereby[] ... delay the arrival of low-cost
generic alternatives" as well as "exclude other innovators" from building
on prior knowledge.226
Kotlikoffs work repeated the myth of exclusivity. While it might be
fair to call patents monopoly-like, that is not a fair characterization of da-
ta exclusivity.227 Professors Grabowski and Joseph DiMasi thus responded
that data exclusivity does not provide a monopoly or protection from
competitors with therapeutic alternatives.!" In fact, they pointed out, in-
novators face dynamic competition from other innovators and vigorously
introduce therapeutic alternatives and advances-which would be de-
terred in a world with rapid entry of biosimilars.They pointed out that
market forces, especially insurance firms and pharmacy-benefit manag-
ers, will correct when innovators introduce improvements that do not
provide adequate clinical benefit.23° Unlike Alex Brill, Professor Kotlikoff
did not offer economic analysis to support any particular length of exclu-
sivity. This disagreement is thus largely over the nature of competition in
the biologics industry, and the legal and regulatory research presented in
this Article tends to align with the economic conclusions of Professor
Grabowksi and colleagues. 2 1
All of this invites the question: What should be done with respect to
the term of exclusivity for non-biological drugs? Professor Grabowski's
June 2008 paper suggested that his conclusion supporting 12 years for
biological drugs carries over to non-biological drugs. He presented a
comparative analysis for new chemical entities under the FDCA with data
previously collected for these cohorts and found break-even points of 16
years for the 1980s NCE cohort and 15 years for the 1990s cohort.212 To
this research one might add a recent paper in Health Affairs presenting a
fresh analysis of returns on new drug research and development, includ-
'2' See KOTLIKOFF, supra note 58, at 1.
Id. at 16.
See supra Section II.C.
See Grabowski & DiMasi, supra note 189, at 3-4.
See also supra Section II.
Grabowski & DiMasi, supra note 189, at 5.
23' See also Henry Grabowski et al., Data Exclusivity Periods and Next Generation
Improvements to Innovator Biologics: Key Issues 1-7 (Duke Univ. Dept. of Econ. Working
Paper No. 2009-05, 2009) (making many of the same points about the nature of
competition in the biologics industry, turning to the question of incentives for
pioneers to develop second-generation molecules, and concluding that products
resulting in separate full BLAs should not receive a different, shorter exclusivity
period).
22 See Grabowski, supra note 219, at 484.
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ing the 2000s cohort. This study found a significant drop in returns.
Although the paper omitted a break-even analysis, unless the cost of capi-
tal has shrunk over time, break-even times for the average new-drug in-
troduction may now exceed expected market life.
2M
Another empirical approach to the question is offered by Professor
Dana Goldman at the University of Southern California. He projects that
a 12-year term in the FDCA, instead of the five-year term, would result in
228 extra drug approvals between 2020 and 2060.235 He also calculates
that people turning 55 in 2060 could expect an increase in life expectan-
cy (as a result of new drugs) of 1.44 years with 12 years of exclusivity, as
compared to 1.30 years under the status quo of five years. Finally, he con-
cludes that the financial benefit of this additional longevity exceeds its
cost, but notes the difference appears to be modest before 2 0 6 0 .2. This
research is important because it may be the first to quantify the social-
welfare benefit from a longer exclusivity term. It has limitations, however,
because of inherent uncertainty about future changes in drug regulations
as well as future scientific and medical progress. In any case, as the au-
thors note, there has not been much appetite for lengthening data exclu-
sivity for non-biological drugs, particularly when the net social benefits
are more than five decades out.
IV. CONCLUSION
Section II of this Article offers an important insight about data ex-
clusivity for drugs. The overall approach can be reframed as one in which
there is one pathway to market for any who wish to market a particular
new drug, subject to patent considerations and business judgment. After
a period of time, the rules change to permit cheaper and faster licenses
to market the drug, relying on another company's earlier submitted re-
search. The myth of data exclusivity, exposed by this reframing, is that it
is an affirmative grant to first entrants from the government. In 1984, pi-
oneers with non-biological drugs approved after 1962 lost something:
their right to perpetual exclusive use of their research became a right to
only five years of exclusive use. And in 2010, pioneers with licensed bio-
logical drugs lost something: their perpetual exclusive right was short-
ened to 12 years. This reframing identifies the primary beneficiary of the
233 See Ernst R. Berndt et al., Decline in Economic Returns from New Drugs Raises
Questions About SustainingInnovations, 34 HEALTH ArF. 245, 250-51 (2015).
22 For similar reasons, in 2007 the National Academies recommended at least
doubling the five-year term for new chemical entities. See NAT'L ACAD. OF ScI., NAT'L
ACAD. OF ENG'G & INST. OF MED., RISING ABOVE THE GATHERING STORM: ENERGIZING
AND EMPLOYING AMERICA FOR A BRIGHTER ECONOMIc FUTURE 190 (2007).
23 See Dana P. Goldman et al., The Benefits from Giving Makers of Conventional
'Small Molecule' Drugs Longer Exclusivity Over Clinical Trial Data, 30 HEALTH AFt. 84, 87
(2011).
"1 Id. at 87-89.
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choice made by policymakers as follow-on applicants, rather than pio-
neers.
With this refraining in place, Section III of this Article turns to the
question whether and on what terms society derives a net benefit from a
period of time during which all applicants face the same barrier to mar-
ket entry. The insights of the third Section are as follows.
First, it is possible that without a shortcut pathway to market, second
entrants might introduce duplicates of a drug after the patent expired
(or if there was no patent). More likely, though, given the cost of prepar-
ing a full application (even with a head start from public information),
they would seek to be second-in-class in order to differentiate themselves
in the market. But, society would not achieve the significant cost savings
that are possible through undifferentiated copies that rely on the first en-
trant's labor, and at least with respect to medicines, society has a compel-
ling need for those cost savings. If abbreviated applications were permit-
ted immediately, however, innovators would not innovate except in
complete alignment with patent protection and subject to the considera-
ble uncertainty and shortcomings of patent protection in this industry
sector. The net result would be cheaper duplicates of medicines in the
current armamentarium, but less research into better cures or cures for
currently untreatable diseases. For dynamic welfare reasons, and to pre-
vent market failure, some sort of delay in the shortcut pathway is war-
ranted.
Second, there are good reasons to adopt a product-by-product ap-
proach to abbreviated applications (the PHSA approach) rather than fo-
cusing on the novelty of the active ingredient (the FDCA approach). The
product approach (standing alone, without a first licensure provision)
does not force the agency into meticulous and possibly inconsistent dis-
tinctions or efforts to predict possible distinctions ahead of the science. It
should therefore reduce administrative disputes and litigation, and their
corollary for innovators, uncertainty. It may also encourage differentiat-
ing innovation. There are also good reasons to adopt the European ap-
proach to incremental innovation--one or a few modest extensions of
the base exclusivity term for significant new conditions of use-and to
require that follow-on applicants limit themselves to true copies (and not
file hybrid applications).
This conclusion offers preliminary thoughts on how the choices dis-
cussed in Section III might play out in practice.
Consider, first, the FDCA model, where automatically substitutable
generics may be proposed after five years. Even if the first entrant does
not hold a patent that will block identical products, a second entrant is
unlikely to seek approval of a copy via a full application, unless it was
quite far along the research and development pathway at the time of first-
entrant approval. The shortness of the first entrant's exclusivity term and
the substitutability of its generics provide the second entrant with good
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reason not to proceed with an innovative product. This is because the
second entrant would face a market flooded with generic copies of its
primary competitor only a few years after its own approval. Conceivably,
the second entrant could change research strategy and differentiate itself
in the marketplace, opting for a not-quite-identical product (perhaps a
different route of administration and formulation) subject to a full appli-
cation. It would receive three years of exclusivity, which would protect it
from generic applications and probably also-under current FDA poli-
cy-from 505(b) (2) applications citing the first entrant and proposing
variations that copied its differentiating innovation. But unless its differ-
entiation was highly meaningful in the clinic, it would lose substantial
market share to generics of the first entrant. If the first entrant did hold a
patent that might block identical products, a second entrant would need
to choose between filing an abbreviated application (as early as year
four) challenging the patent, on the one hand, and innovating around
the patents and filing a full application for a variation, on the other
hand. The latter strategy would be rational only if the modifications in its
product would be sufficiently valuable in the clinic to justify physician se-
lection and premium (brand) pricing for several years after substitutable
generics of the pioneer product became available.
And consider the PHSA model, which permits approval of biosimi-
lars after 12 years but does not currently entail automatic therapeutic-
equivalence ratings. If the first entrant does not have a patent that may
block the second entrant, the latter might indeed seek approval of a du-
plicative product via a full application-particularly if it had started re-
search and development at or around the same time as the first entrant.
Where exclusivity attaches to each product, the second company's incen-
tive to prepare a full application may increase, and in the absence of au-
tomatic substitution, its incentive may increase further, as it may not lose
market share precipitously to copies of the first entrant. (This will de-
pend a bit on payer policies). And if the second entrant can differentiate
its product, so as to market on the basis of product features as well as
price, it may choose to do so. A second entrant might not, however, start
a duplicate from scratch after the first entrant's product is licensed, given
the time necessary for the full research-and-development process (even
with the head start from public information). Once therapeutic-
equivalence designations become relatively automatic, second entrants
who were well underway when the first entrant obtained approval might
continue with identical products that could obtain approval early in the
12-year period, but the value of an undifferentiated market entry will
drop drastically as one moves further into the 12-year period. This is par-
ticularly true if there are likely to be multiple copies of the first entrant.
In brief, as long as first-entrant data exclusivity expires before the
second entrant research-and-development ramp ends-e.g., as long as
data exclusivity is 5 or 12 years and research and development take 10 to
[Vol. 20:1
THE MYTHS OF DATA EXCLUSIVITY
12 years-we will rarely see second entrants file full applications for du-
plicates, even where there is no patent protection. The primary excep-
tions might be where the regulatory requirements for abbreviated appli-
cations are uncertain (for example, in the case of a complex or poorly
understood product, where an ANDA seems impossible and a 505(b) (2)
with clinical data seems necessary); where automatic substitution of
products approved via abbreviated application is less likely (for instance,
because the follow-on product will require a 505(b) (2) application or be-
cause the drug has a narrow therapeutic index); or where the second en-
trant began research and development well before approval of the first
entrant. We might see (and have seen) second entrants filing full appli-
cations for duplicates in those situations, and we might also see them do
so if data exclusivity were substantially longer than the research-and-
development ramp (assuming patents were also not an issue). On the
whole, an abbreviated pathway should in itself steer second-entrant pio-
neers towards differentiated products, and a shorter data-exclusivity term
may do so more than a longer data-exclusivity term.
This Article suggests adoption of a base exclusivity term for all drugs
close to, or perhaps exceeding, the 12 years currently in place for biolog-
ical drugs-with a modest base extension for incremental improvements,
exclusivity on a product basis, and limitation of abbreviated applications
to actual replicas (no hybrids). It also assumes automatic therapeutic-
equivalence ratings. In this model, where patents are not in play, we
might see undifferentiated second entrants at the very beginning of the
data-exclusivity period, provided the companies had started research dur-
ing the first entrant's own premarket period. We might also see them
where there is uncertainty about the viability of an abbreviated pathway
for scientific reasons. In general, however, we should see second entrants
opting for meaningfully differentiated products or (more likely, especial-
ly where patents are in play) second-in-class positions, and we should see
both (but especially the former) tapering off towards the end of the data-
exclusivity period, on account of the threat of less expensive and substi-
tutable copies of the first entrant. Their products will provide price and
feature competition.
A similar analysis could be brought to bear with respect to other re-
search-based licensure schemes. There, too, data exclusivity is not award-
ed by the government; it is the absence of a cheaper, faster, reliance-
based pathway for competitors. It is thus not a monopoly (or analogous
to patent), nor does it block competition from others on the same terms.
Permitting abbreviated licensure applications immediately (or too soon)
may result in market failure, and permitting them on the wrong terms
may harm innovation incentives to the detriment of not only innovators
but also follow-on applicants and consumers. Understanding the terms
on which innovation will proceed, with an abbreviated pathway in place,
requires understanding the larger regulatory structure and the nature of
2016]
164 LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:1
competition in the marketplace in question. All of this is informed by a
corrected understanding of what data exclusivity is, and what it is not.
